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11 INTRODUCTION
Within the framework of a democratic political system, a central 
issue for political scientists is electoral behaviour: what determines
how people vote. The reasons for concern with this issue are several. 
The findings of the political scientists may be of use to politicians 
and political parties, to keep them informed of 'public opinion', 
to help predict election results, or to provide more direct information 
as to how to best ensure re-election. Alternatively, the findings may 
help political scientists and sociologists understand more about the 
political and social structure of their society. Or they may shed some 
light on the relationship between democracy on the one hand, and apathy 
and alienation on the other: why is it that there can be a low level of
interest in politics, yet people will still bother to vote? For these 
reasons and others, political scientists are interested in political 
behaviour. The concern of many of them - in particular, those whose 
work is relevant to this thesis - is to discover what the social factors 
are that influence voting behaviour and political attitudes.
The social influences of political attitudes and behaviour are 
considered to include childhood socialisation by agents such as family 
and peer groups; later socialisation through a person's experiences 
in adult life; social characteristics such as occupation, education, 
income, religion, region, age and sex;^ aRd the political 'climate of
opinion'. The research of the political scientists falls into broad
1 Although age is a biological characteristic, it has social ramific­
ations: for example, it is thought to influence a person's degree of
conservatism. The characteristic sex is strictly speaking only a 
biological one, as it refers to the male-female dichotomy. Gender, 
referring to the masculine-feminine dichotomy, is the more correct 
term when social aspects are involved. For the sake of conformity 
the more common term - sex - will be used throughout this thesis, but 
should be taken to refer to the social features.
2streams corresponding to these groupings. Thus there is a large body 
of research on political socialisation, usually involving surveys of 
schoolchildren. There is an equally large body of research into the 
socio-economic determinants of political behaviour and attitudes, 
involving surveys of adults. Adult socialisation, although acknow­
ledged to be important, has not attracted much research. The 'climates 
of opinion' idea also has had little empirical study.
The importance of childhood socialisation studies rests on the
dubious assumption that they can cast light on adult political
behaviour. 'Political socialization', say Dawson and Prewitt, 'is the
name given the processes through which a citizen acquires his own view
2of the political world'. The studies therefore focus on children, 
to find out how much they know about politics at different ages, and 
how sophisticated their political concepts are. bhat the studies do 
not do, however, is demonstrate just how the children's attitudes and 
knowledge are translated into adult attitudes and interest. Recent 
research has raised doubts about whether such a process even takes 
place.^
If the subject of childhood socialisation is regarded as a field 
of study in its own right, rather than assuming it will contribute to 
an understanding of adult behaviour, there are still problems to be
2 R.E. Dawson 6 K. Prewitt, Political Socialization, 1969, p.6.
As A.F. Davies notes in 'Political socialisation', 1972, the 
researchers in this field probably have an underlying assumption 
involving the Freudian notion that much of importance in adult 
behaviour is established very early in childhood.
For all references, author, title of article or book, and year of
publication are given. Full journal or publication details are given in the bibliography.
3 Doubt on the validity of the assumption that there is a link between 
childhood and adult orientations has been raised by D. Searing et al, 
'The structuring principle: political socialization and belief 
systems', 1973.
3overcome. The researchers rarely study, at anything more than a 
superficial level, the social-psychological processes by which
children come to form their political outlooks from the heterogeneous 
and disordered pieces of political information they receive.^ The 
most damaging criticism, however, is that there is now serious doubt 
that children even have meaningful political attitudes. Yet political 
socialisation researchers have never questioned whether their subject- 
matter exists.^
Researchers in the social characteristics school take a different
approach. Rather than assuming that childhood experiences are the
most important factors in determining adult political outlooks, they
assume that it is a person's social position, defined in terms of
occupation, education, income, and the rest, that determines his or
her attitudes.4 56 7 A rationale for this approach is given by Milne and
Mackenzie. A researcher, they say, in seeking why people vote the way
they do, cannot just ask them directly, because the answers he receives
may be a mixture of factors. Some may refer to the present, others
to the past, while habitual voters may be quite unable to give a
reason. To do so, they would be forced:
to pull up their whole psychology by its roots, to get outside themselves, in order to give a reasoned answer.
This is clearly impossible, and the alternative is for 
the researcher himself to try to discover correlations 
between what the person says ^nd his circumstances, or 
what he says and his history.-
4 R.W. Connell, The Child's Construction of Politics, 1971, is an 
attempt to rectify this.
5 P.M. Vaillancourt, 'Stability of children's survey responses', 1973, 
shows how tenuous the assumption is. Other critical studies of the 
political socialisation school include R.W. Connell ft M. Goot, 
'Science and ideology in American ''political socialization" research' 
1972-93, and W. Schonfeld, 'The focus of political socialization 
research: an evaluation', 1970-71.
6 There is some recognition, if only implicit, of childhood experiences because these partly determine a person's occupation, education and
income. But of course it is not these kinds of experiences that the 
other researchers, in the political socialisation school, study.
7 Quoted from H. Durant, 'Opinion polls and the study of political 
behaviour', in R. Milne $ H. Mackenzie, Marginal Seat, 1958, p.157.
4Milbrath takes a similar line: conditions such as class or place of
residence 'form personalities, beliefs and attitudes which, in turn, 
do ncause" (are requisite to) specific acts such as participation 
in politics'.^
A criticism of this approach is provided by researchers who 
emphasise the importance of the political climate of opinion. V.O. Key 
argues that social characteristics or attributes are important only 
when there is a topic of debate that is directly relevant to a partic­
ular attribute. For example, businessmen will only vote as a group 
when an election concerns an issue in which they have a direct and 
clear interest. Key makes the point that if the political scientists 
find that 70 percent of businessmen voted one way, he would ask why 
the other 30 percent did not vote according to their apparent economic 
interest.^
The answer to such a question, rather than destroying the validity 
of the social characteristics approach, shows how the different schools
can be integrated to provide a comprehensive explanation. In any 
election there will be several issues, and the relative importance of 
each to an individual will depend partly on how that person has been 
socialised, partly on his or her social position, and partly on current 
experiences influenced by the climate of opinion. If these different 
influences create cross pressures it is possible that the businessmen 
will not necessarily vote in their best economic interests: other 
factors may be more important.
What I am suggesting, then, is that probably the most valid 
explanation of political behaviour would involve a combination of all
8 L. Milbrath, Political Participation, 1965, p.110.
9 V.O. Key, Jr., The Responsible Electorate,1966.
5approaches, however, the relative importance of each, and their 
interrelation with each other, has rarely been discussed, much less
studied. The researchers in the first two schools make token recog­
nition of the importance of the other influences, but then assume 
them to be constant for the purposes of their study. For example,
the influence of social class on childhood socialisation is either 
not studied - by choosing a sample of children from one school and 
assuming that this will produce (in terms of social class) a relatively 
homogeneous sample - or if it is mentioned, it is given only brief 
treatment.10 Conversely, those researchers who study the influence 
of social characteristics on political behaviour often take socialis­
ation into account only by asking about parents' party preferences.
When a comprehensive theory is suggested, it usually rests on 
the idea of layers of orientation.* 11 This argument is that childhood 
socialisation produces the most basic and firmly held beliefs, while 
adult experiences, which are partly determined by one's social position, 
reinforce these basic beliefs and provide less basic orientations.
The particular political influences of the time produce the least 
basic orientations, such as attitudes on current issues. This may 
sound plausible, but at present it is only an hypothesis and has yet 
to be subjected to rigorous examination. Also, the criticisms of the 
political socialisation school, particularly the questioning of whether 
fundamental and meaningful attitudes are established in childhood and 
have any relation to adult attitudes, would first have to be overcome.
10 R.D. Mess $ J.V. Torney, in The Development of Political Attitudes 
in Children, 1967, devote one chapter to the influence of both 
social class and intelligence. D. Easton § J. Dennis, in Children 
in the Political System, 1969, spend less than 8 pages discussing 
socio-economic status and socialisation.
11 Dawson $ Prewitt, Political Socialization, 1969, suggest this in 
Chapter 2, and Davies has a similar argument in his article 'Political 
socialisation', 1972. H. McClosky £ H.E. Dalilgren also mention the 
idea in 'Primary group influence on party loyalty', 1959. See also 
w.j. N'cGuire,'The nature of attitudes and attitude change', 1969.
This thesis focuses on research of the social characteristics 
school, and in particular on the attribute of sex. However, this
should not be taken to indicate that I believe that social character­
istics are the only influences on political behaviour, or even the 
most important ones. An understanding of the influence of sex can 
only be gained by a study of its interrelationship with socialisation, 
adult experiences, and the political and social climates of opinion. 
Unfortunately it is beyond the scope of this thesis to attempt such 
an integrated approach.
What I hope to do in the thesis is establish whether there are 
any differences between women and men in their political behaviour, 
attitudes, knowledge and interest. This will be done in two stages.
The first involves an extended literature review of some of the major 
studies of political behaviour and social characteristics, to find out 
what has been said about sex differences, what the image is of the 
political behaviour of women, and what assumptions the political 
scientists have made in constructing the image. The arguments used 
to support the political scientists' findings will be critically 
examined. That such an examination is essential is shown by a recent 
review of the political science studies by Murray Goot and Elizabeth
Reid which finds countless discrepancies between figures and interpret -
12ation, between statements of fact and conclusion.
From the literature review I will draw some hypotheses about sex 
differences, which are tested in the second stage of the research.
This involves an analysis of data from an Australian survey of political 
attitudes, carried out in 1969 by Don Aitkin and Michael Kahan.
6
12 M. Goot $ E. Reid, 'Mindless matrons or sexist scientism?' 1973.
The Aitkin and Kahan survey is similar to overseas surveys. 
These started when Lazarsfeld, Rerelson and Gaudet studied voting
7
patterns in Erie County, Ohio, for the 1940 Presidential election and 
produced The Peopled Choice. This was followed by other studies, 
both in limited geographical areas and on nation-wide scales. The 
major studies in the United States include: Berelson, Lazarsfeld and 
SicPhee, Voting (1954), Campbell, Gurin and Miller, The Voter Decides 
(1954), Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, The American Voter
(1960) , Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy (1961), and 
Milbrath, Political Participation (1965). There are also some British 
studies, the most notable being Milne and Mackenzie, Straight Fight 
(1954), Milne and Mackenzie, Marginal Seat 1955 (1958), and Butler and 
Stokes, Political Change in Britain (1969). Almond and Verba provide 
an international study, in The Civic Culture (1963).
In Australia the major studies include Burns, Parties and People
(1961) , Rawson, Australia Votes (1961), and Power, Politics in a 
Suburban Community (1968). These have been based on single electorates 
and relatively small sample sizes. The Aitkin and kahan survey is
the first national survey in Australia, with a sample size large 
enough to permit multidimensional analysis. As the questionnaire for 
this survey incorporates questions with similar wording to overseas 
surveys, comparisons can be made. The Aitkin and kahan study really 
involves two separate surveys, one conducted in 1967 and one in 1969. 
About three-quarters of the people interviewed in the first wave were 
reinterviewed in the second, so that the 1969 survey of over 1800 
people included about 1400 who had previously been interviewed. My 
research uses data from the 1969 survey only.
8The literature review will be limited primarily to the American, 
British and Australian studies as it is felt that these three countries 
are similar enough in tradition and culture to enable comparisons to 
be made. It is recognised, however, that the findings in one country 
are not necessarily generalisable to the other countries. However, 
the use of Australian data for testing hypotheses drawn from overseas 
data, besides pointing up needs for further research, should also 
suggest limits, in geography and time, to the generality of the 
original claims.
A second limitation of the study involves the use of secondary 
analysis: my purpose in using the data is different from that for 
which the survey was designed. While the survey may be all that the 
original researchers hoped for, there is some information missing 
which would have been helpful to my research. The most serious omission 
is that the survey asked for the occupation and income of the head of 
the household, defined as the person responsible for the rent or 
purchase of the house, instead of asking this information of the respond­
ent. This means that for most of the married women, and women living 
with their parents, we know only whether they are working or not. This 
imposes a serious limitation on the measurement of social class of the 
female respondents. It is felt that the social class of the woman's 
husband or her father is not a completely satisfactory alternative 
measure of her own social class. Another serious omission from the
13 As will be seen in Chapter 4, the head of the household is usually 
male. Only 17% of the women in the sample are classified as heads 
of households, compared with 65% of the men. It has been standard 
practice to determine the socio-economic status of married women by 
their husband's status, along with using the father's status for 
those respondents, male and female, who live with their parents. The 
practice can hardly be justified for those women (and offspring) who 
work full-time, while for those who stay at home, the sociologists 
should start thinking about how to classify the occupation 'house­wife'. If it is argued that the husband's status should be taken as
the relevant one because the wife's status is determined by his occ­
upation and income, then perhaps we should be looking at some average
(cont. next pagel
9survey, as far as my work is concerned, is that there are no questions 
relating to sense of political efficacy.
A third limitation in using a 1969 survey is that already it is 
more than five years old, and any findings as regards sex differences 
could now be out of date. This is particularly so in light of recent 
changes that have come about as a result of the women’s movement.
Although the movement was well under way in the United States and
Britain in 1969, it did not start to have an impact in Australia until
141970. So my research will uncover the sex differences (or lack of 
them) before the advent of the new feminist movement. This means 
that it can be used for comparison with later research to find out to 
what extent the women's movement has had an effect on the political 
orientations of women in Australia.
Finally, as regards the subject-matter, the scope of the research 
includes 'active' behaviour such as working for a political party, or 
voting, and 'passive' behaviour such as following political news and 
discussing politics. ^  Political attitudes include party preferences, 
and various specific issues from current affairs to more fundamental 
principles: anything from opinions on conscription to the relative powers 
of trade unions and big business. Interest in politics, and knowledge 
about political matters, are also included. 'Political' is used in
13 (cont.) family status. If the wife is working, the total family income will be higher than if she is not. A good discussion of
the problems of defining the status of women is found in D. Darroch, 
'Some thoughts on a theory of sexual stratification', 1974.
14 Probably the first Women's Liberation meeting in Australia was in 
December 1969 in Sydney. Women’s Electoral Lobby started in mid- 
1972. The Australian Women's Weekly first published an article 
on Women's Liberation in February 1971.
15 A similar distinction is made by J.S. W'estern 5 P.R. Wilson in 
'Politics: participation and attitudes', 1973, and by L.W. Milbrath, 
Political Participation, 1965.
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the usual sense that political scientists use it, to cover those 
matters relating to institutional, or public, politics. It does 
not include private or personal politics, which involve power relations 
between individuals in a family, a workplace, or a peer group sit­
uation. Thus while it may be of interest to discover the power 
relationship between, say, husbands and wives, in this study it is 
of interest only insofar as it may affect who influences whom in 
matters of public politics such as voting.
11
2 PAST RESEARCH: IMAGE CONSTRUCTION OR FABRICATION?
Some of the most solidly researched and validated 
findings in the social sciences relate to the 
differential participation of men and women in 
political activities of all kinds from voting 
and membership of parties, to interest in politics 
and political attitudes.
So say Dowse and Hughes at the start of their article on sex 
differences among children.^ Milbrath, also, states that 'The 
finding that men are more likely to participate in politics than 
women is one of the most thoroughly substantiated in social 
science.'^
If such statements are correct, this review of past research 
would largely consist of no more than listing the thoroughly sub­
stantiated findings and listing the writers who have solidly re­
searched and validated them. However, doubts about the research have 
been raised by Goot and Reid in 'Mindless matrons or sexist 
scientism?' This very comprehensive review has pointed up numerous 
contradictions, biases, unsubstantiated claims and sheer misreporting 
in the various political science studies. The authors look at evidence 
that the researchers present to support various common hypotheses con­
cerning the political role of women. These hypotheses include: that 
children adopt the party preference of their fathers; that wives 
follow their husbands; that women are more conservative than men;that 
women are traditionalists, or alternatively, that they are fickle; 
and that women personalise politics. Goot and Reid come to the
1 R.E. Dowse § J.A. Hughes, 'Girls, boys and politics', 1971, p.53
2 L. Milbrath, Political Participation, 1965, p. 155. Presumably in this quotation he is using ^participation^ in the same 
broad sense as is used in the rest of his book, i.e., to include 
participation from holding office to 'exposing oneself to 
political stimuli'. (p. 18)
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conclusion that the evidence taken to be support for these 
hypotheses is often very biased, and the bias is in one direction:
. . . much of the work we have reviewed simply
assumes the dominant values serving the dominant groups of society. The values taken for granted
here are the values of the (male) researchers 
operating in a male dominated society.3
It is inevitable that my research into the same studies, under­
taken with a similar perspective, will produce much overlap with the
Goot and Reid article. It is inevitable, also, after the comprehen­
siveness of their review, that I can contribute very little that is 
new. Rather than try, I will take a different approach which will focus 
on only a few articles, but will go into them in more depth. That is, 
instead of picking out what various writers say on a particular topic,
I will go through the arguments of each writer, to try to discover how 
the image of women's political roles has been built up. In the course 
of doing this, and with the support from the Goot and Reid article, I 
will draw out those hypotheses, or 'substantiated findings' that seem to 
be the most commonly accepted in the research.
The survey in Erie County concerning the 1940 Presidential 
election, conducted by Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, was the first 
of the modern political science studies of electoral behaviour. As it 
is undoubtedly a source of influence for later studies, it is of interest 
to note what these researchers said about sex differences. It seems that 
they did not make the discovery that there are political differences;
even before their research it was conventional wisdom that differences 
existed: 'There is a prevailing belief that women are less interested
in politics than are men. This is corroborated by our data . . .  33 per 
cent of the men but only 23 per cent of the women professed great
3 M. Goot and E. Reid, 'Mindless matrons or sexist scientism?' 1973 
p. 53
13
interest in the election.'^ Intention to vote provides more evidence:
although the writers do not give overall figures, the trend is that at
each level of interest (great, medium or none), women are less likely to
say they intend to vote.*’ As interest decreases, the greater is the
amount of deliberate non-voting among women compared with men. The
authors say that there is greater social pressure on men to vote, even
when they are not interested. Thus 'men are better citizens but women
are more reasoned: if they are not interested, they do not vote.'^
The researchers then give three quotes to show that some women regard
politics as a man's business, and conclude from this that although
legal restrictions on women's participation in politics have been
removed, 'the attitude of women toward politics has not yet brought
7them into full equality with men'.
This type of reasoning is typical of the researchers. From small 
differences, or from a few quotations, they draw a conclusion that
g
implicates all women. In this case, three quotations from the 1400 
women they interviewed is enough for the researchers to talk about 'the
qattitude of women toward politics', as if all women held only one attitude.
4 P. Lazarsfeld, B. Berelson 5 H. Gaudet, The People's Choice, 1948,p.45.
5 Ibid., Chart 16, p. 48. Working front this chart, the overall figures 
of non-voting are about 2% for men and 17% for women. The figure for 
men seems particularly low in the light of later findings on male non­
voting rates. This suggests that there may be pressure on men to
say they will vote even when they do not intend to.
6 Ibid., p. 48.
7 Ibid., p. 49.
8 They say that only 'some' women held this particular attitude, but 
claim that remarks such as the ones they quoted were 'not infrequent'. 
However, they should be giving absolute numbers if they want to draw
a general conclusion such as they have done.
9 The use of anecdotal material in discussing women's political roles 
is fairly common in the studies, more common than in other areas.
One could suspect that this may be because the figures are not strong 
enough to show what the political scientists believe to be the case.
In the same chapter, only two other responses are quoted. Both are 
very short and no broad conclusion is drawn from them in the same 
way that the conclusion on women's attitudes is drawn.
14
Along with the report on findings about political interest and 
voting turnout, the only other mention of sex differences concerns 
husband-wife relationships. The researchers found a high degree of 
agreement on voting intention between couples, with less than 5 per 
cent disagreeing. They say of this 'the almost perfect agreement 
between husband and wife comes about as a result of male dominance 
in political situations'.^ The evidence of male dominance is that 
more women than men report discussing the election with their spouse, 
which means that 'Men do not feel that they are discussing politics 
with their wives; they feel they are telling them'.^ This is evid­
enced by two quotes, one of which hardly supports the notion that the 
husband is tel ling his wife: the woman states 'My husband has always 
been Republican. He says that if we vote for different parties 
there is no use in our voting. So I think I will give in this year 
and vote Republican.' ^
The difference between the sexes in this area, that the women 
are more likely to report political discussions with their spouses 
than are the men, can hardly be regarded as an important one. In the 
sample, 45 women and 4 men reported such discussions, but while the 
relative difference is large, the absolute numbers are small. At the
most, only 15 percent of women said they discussed politics with their 
13husbands, hardly evidence of 'male dominance in political situations'.
10 Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, The People's Choice, 1948, p. 141.
11 Ibid., p. 141.
12 Ibid., p. 142,
13 It is not clear what size sample this was drawn from, and it may be 
anything from 600 to 2700. The authors state only 'at one point
of the study we asked each respondent whether he had discussed 
politics with someone else in recent weeks'. (ibid., p. 141.)
This would suggest that the full sample of 2700 was asked, in 
which case only about 4% of women say they discussed politics with 
their husbands.
15
Six years later, Berelson and Lazarsfeld came together again,
with William McPhee replacing Hazel Gaudet, to produce Voting, a
study of the 1948 Presidential election in Elmira, New York. This
study, too, does not devote much attention to sex differences. It
confirms (or repeats) what was found in Erie County regarding political
discussions between husbands and wives. At the time of the election,
69 percent of married women, but only 41 percent of married men, said
they discussed politics with a family member. Although spouses are
not differentiated from other family members, the authors state that
this shows that women look to their husbands: 'the men discuss politics
with their wives - that is, they tell them - but they do not partic-
14ularly respect them'. The wives have trust in their husband's 
opinions, and the husbands feel they need to give them guidance.
Either the authors have more evidence than they have presented 
in the book, or they are allowing their preconceptions to influence 
them in their conclusions.^ The figures, obviously, relate only to 
the extent to which people discuss politics with their family; they 
do not relate to the nature of these discussions. The fact that more 
women than men admit to family political discussions does not necess­
arily lead to the conclusion they reach. Indeed,this conclusion is 
not supported a few pages later, when we are told about the nature of 
political discussions: 'At the height of the campaign . . . political 
discussion of the grass-roots level apparently consists more of the 
exchange of mutually agreeable remarks than of controversial ones.'^ 
An even greater contradiction comes from a point they make some pages 
earlier, concerning the effects of small groups. They find primary
14 B. Berelson, P. Lazarsfeld § W. McPhee, Voting, 1954, p. 102.
15 If their preconceptions have been formed by their earlier book,
this conclusion is not surprising.
16 Ibid., p. 106.
16
group solidarity of a high order. 'In the end many American families
vote as a unit, making joint decisions in voting as in spending parts
17of the common family income.'
Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee also find a difference between 
men and women regarding voting. They note that there is a relation
between party preference and social class, as the higher socio­
economic status groups 'vote more Republican'. These groups also 
have greater political solidarity compared to the workers who are not 
particularly class conscious. The sex difference is that 'women, less
politicized than men, follow the class tendency in voting less than 
18men'. Thus while 88 percent of men with high socio-economic status 
voted Republican, only 76 percent of the women did. Among those with 
low socio-economic status, 51 percent of the men voted Republican, 
compared with 61 percent of the women.
It is not clear whether the authors are saying that women are
less politicised than men because they follow the class tendency less,
or whether they are claiming that women follow the class tendency
less than men do because they are less politicised. Either way the
statement is questionable: the first is a dubious definition of
politicisation, the second makes a claim without offering evidence to
support it. Furthermore, the finding is not very meaningful because
they are probably talking about the socio-economic status of the
1 qwoman's husband (or father) rather than her own status.
17 Berelson, Lazarsfeld $ McPhee, Voting, 1954, pp. 92-93, emphasis 
added.
18 Ibid., p. 75.
19 If this is so, then the fact that women differ from men in 
following the class tendency less than men do, may be an indication 
of the extent to which women do not just vote the way their husbands 
(or fathers) do.
The finding does indicate that women are not always 'more 
Republican' than men, at least not in the highest status groups.
The authors discuss this subject, the influence of sex on party 
choice, in the concluding part of the book. They state that there is 
not a 'distinctive woman's vote' because a political interest needs 
to have a social base, and there are few policy issues persisting over 
time that affect men and women differently. Thus they conclude that 
in relation to sex, 'there is little relevance of this characteristic 
to political matters, at least so far as party preference is concerned'.
The same year that Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee published 
their study of Elmira, the Survey Research Center at Michigan published 
its first national study of voting behaviour. This was Campbell,
Gurin and Miller's The Voter Decides, based on the 1952 Presidential 
election. This report provides some further evidence of differences 
between the sexes, in particular on candidate orientation and political 
efficacy.
Firstly the authors look at voting behaviour among their 1600
respondents. They found that 79 percent of the men, and 69 percent
of the women, said they voted. Combining actual vote with party
preference of those who did not vote, they found 53 percent of the
men and 54 percent of the women supported the Republican candidate,
while 44 percent of the men and 43 percent of the women chose the
Democratic candidate. By looking at voting preferences in 1948, the
authors find that there was a general shift to the Republicans, but
'women did not contribute any greater proportion of the Republican
21vote in 1952 than they did in 1948'.
17
20 Berelson, Lazarsfeld $ McPhee, Voting, 1954, p. 320.
21 A. Campbell, G. Gurin § W. Miller, The Voter Decides, 1954, p. 75.
18
From this the authors conclude that the vote division among 
women and men is not significantly different. Further, women’s 
participation,
although somewhat on the restrained side, was 
not greatly different from that of men. The 
relationship between sex differences and 
partisanship conforms, by and large, to the 
lack of a sex difference in the vote.^2
However there is a difference, say the authors, in candidate and 
issue orientation. Women were 'disproportionately low in their concern 
with issues, contributing only 39 per cent of the highly issue-involved 
people and 75 per cent of the uninvolved'. The authors do not point 
it out here, but it should be noted that only 19 percent of the sample 
were in this uninvolved group. In contrast to this, continue the 
authors, the women showed 'a somewhat greater than average concern 
with candidates'.
'Somewhat greater’, turns out to be that 61 percent of the people 
much concerned with candidates were women, and only 51 percent of the 
people least concerned were women. Again, searching through the book 
we discover that the 'highly concerned' group make up only 10 percent 
of the sample, while those who are least concerned with the candidates 
(where the male-female difference of 2 percentage points is neglig­
ible) comprise 43 percent of the sample. The lowest two of five 
groups comprise 64 percent of the sample: of these groups? 51 percent 
are women, 49 percent men, compared with the overall sample average 
of 53 percent women, 47 percent men. Thus for two-thirds of the 
sample there is virtually no difference in candidate orientation and 
for the remaining third the difference is small, with 58 percent of
22 Campbell, Gurin £ Miller, The Voter Decides, 1954, p. 154.
23 Ibid., p. 155. Women comprised 53% of the sample.
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those having a medium to high candidate orientation being women, 
that is, 5 percentage points more than would be expected.
Nevertheless, the authors turn this into a general conclusion
of 'women's concern with candidates' and note that this, together
with some other findings relating to education and to being a member
of a labor union family, are meaningful differences consistent with
'expectations about political attitudes of these demographic groupings'.^
Campbell, Gurin and Miller have produced the candidate-oriented woman,
on the basis of a small difference among one-third of the sample, and
25measured in a way that, to say the least, is rather subjective.
Another difference between the sexes that the authors found was 
in sense of political efficacy. This was measured by responses to 
five questions designed to find out the extent to which people feel 
they have some influence on government. On a scale of high, medium 
and low efficacy, the authors found that 35 percent of the men, but 
only 20 percent of the women, had a high sense of efficacy. Correspond­
ingly, 17 percent of the men and 23 percent of the women had a low 
sense. No significance tests are given. The authors note also that 
a high sense of efficacy is more likely among whites, among those with 
college education, among those in the highest income group, and among 
those in professional occupations. That is, high efficacy occurs more 
frequently among those with high socio-economic status and greater 
opportunity of access to government - a finding which is not really 
surprising.
24 Campbell, Gurin and Miller, The Voter Decides, 1954, p. 155.
25 Without going into the issue of accurate measurement of attitudes 
at this stage, it should be noted that the authors base their 
measure on the 'spontaneous personal references to the candidates 
made by the respondents', and note that certain arbitrary distinct­
ions had to be made between what was regarded as personal and what 
was nonpersonal.
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A final point on this study concerns the lack of a sex difference
in sense of citizen duty. This is measured by four questions, each
tapping the respondent's attitude to the importance of voting. The
survey found that most people had a relatively high sense of citizen
duty, with only 7 percent of the men and 12 percent of the women
having a low sense. The authors say of this that there is virtually
2 6no difference between the sexes.
Up to this stage, the findings on sex differences have been minor 
commentaries in reports on general electoral behaviour. The research­
ers analysed their data on voting behaviour in relation to a number of 
variables such as occupational class, education, age, race and so on, 
and sex was just one of these variables. As the evidence on sex 
differences started to accumulate, researchers realised that such 
differences could be interesting enough to become a separate subject 
of study. Thus in the early 1950's, UNESCO commissioned a study on 
sex differences in political behaviour. This resulted in Maurice 
Duverger's The Political Role of Women, published in 1955. Before
considering his book, however, I shall summarise the situation at this 
27stage.
The findings from the three American studies fall into three 
groups. The first consists of differences in numbers, and it should 
be noted that none of these factual differences is large enough to 
suggest that there is any qualitative difference in political behaviour 
of the majority of men and women. The factual differences include
26 This indicates a change in the difference between men and women in 
sense of citizen duty from 12 years previously, when Lazarsfeld, 
Berelson and Gaudet found that 'men are better citizens'. This 
claim was from their finding that only 2% of men did not intend to 
vote, compared with 17% of women. See above, p. 13.
27 This summary is from the three studies that I have discussed so far.
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voting turnout: Lazarsfeld et al claim that in 1940,2 percent of the 
men were non-voters, while 17 percent of the women were in this
category. Campbell et al find corresponding figures of 21 percent and
31 percent in 1952. Another factual difference is in professed
interest in the election: the first study found the proportions of men
and women having 'great interest' were 33 percent and 23 percent
respectively. The Campbell et al study has another factual difference,
in political efficacy: 35 percent of men and 20 percent of women have
a high sense of efficacy.
The second group of findings consists of those where the research­
ers note that there are no^  differences. That they have at least been
considered worth reporting suggests that the researchers expected
them to be otherwise. Campbell et al report the non-differences:
they find no sex difference in sense of citizen duty, no 'significant
difference' in the vote division, and a 'not greatly different' degree 
28of participation. Berelson et al also note that sex has 'little 
relevance' to political matters, or at least to party preference.
The third group of findings consists of those differences that 
the authors say exist but which have not, to my mind, been adequately 
demonstrated. This group includes the idea suggested by Lazarsfeld 
et al that politics is a man's world and women have a different attitude 
to it than do men. Following from this is the idea that men tell their 
wives how to vote, The studies by Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 
and not surprisingly, by Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, suggest this. 
Campbell, Gurin and Miller produce the questionable finding that women 
are less issue oriented and more candidate oriented than are men.
28 There is some degree of contradiction here. On the one hand, 
fewer women than men vote, but on the other, Campbell et al say 
that women's participation is not greatly different from men's, 
and there is no difference in sense of citizen duty, measured 
by one's feeling towards duty to vote.
22
So what did Duverger add to the state of knowledge? Duverger
wanted to discover the extent to which there is real equality between
the sexes in exercising their political prerogatives, given that
legal equality now exists in most modern countries. His study is
a comparative one, using material from France, Germany, Norway and 
Yugoslavia. Although none of the countries that I am primarily
concerned with - Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States - are included, Duverger's book is worth consideration because
it is regarded as a major work on sex differences and is cited by
many of the later researchers.
Duverger's study is divided into two aspects: the part played
by women in elections, and the part played by women in political
leadership. I shall consider only the first part, because my study
29is concerned with electoral behaviour. Duverger considers two broad
topics in this area, women non-voters and the way women vote. Before
looking at the findings in detail, Duverger's conclusion from the
discussion should be noted.
So far as elections are concerned, fhe proportion of women taking part in political life is large,
and does not differ materially from that of men, 
as regards either numbers or composition. It is 
true that there are generally slightly more non­
voters among women than among men, and that the 
woman's vote is generally slightly more conserv­
ative and more subject to religious influences.
But these differences are small and apply only 
to a tiny fraction of the female electorate'.^
The points made in the section on women non-voters include the 
following. There is a general finding that a higher proportion of
29 The other aspect of the political role of women, their part in 
political leadership, is worthy of study but is excluded from my 
thesis because it involves such a small number of women. This of 
course reflects something about the nature of our society - the 
fact that nearly all our political leaders are men.
30 Maurice Duverger, The Political Role of Women, 1955, p. 122, 
emphasis added.
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women than men abstain from voting, but only in Norway (of the four 
countries studied) are the differences large, being up to 19 percent. 
There is some evidence that the small differences in other countries 
are narrowing over time, and are smaller when the totäl vote is large. 
Non-voting is not clearly related to age, but it does seem to be 
related to occupation, with professional women and civil servants 
having the highest voting turnout. However, women who are^not gain­
fully employed do not have a lower turnout, a finding which contradicts 
the generally accepted idea that women must be integrated into the 
professional and business life of the community before they can become 
politically integrated. ,
In particular, a study in Germany found that the highest voting
turnout among women was in two groups, single or widowed civil servants
(the typical emancipated women), and married women not gainfully
employed. The latter result is surprising, says Duverger, because
this group, 'being dependent on their husbands and engaged in the
traditional occupations of the housewife, are much less concerned with
31the world of politics'. This would seem to suggest that these
married women are following their husbands. But the answer is not as
clearcut as this because marriage affects men too: married men have
a higher vote turnout that single men. Thus.:
we are compelled to discard the simple theory that 
the small percentage of abstentions for married 
women is due to their obedience to their husbands' 
instructions . . . the political behaviour of 
husband and wife is usually identical . . . but 
this does not mean that it is unilaterally deter­
mined by the husband.^
31 Duverger, The Political Role of Women, 1955, p. 44. He gives no 
evidence to support this claim.
32 Ibid., p . 44.
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In the second part of this chapter on women's electoral behaviour, 
Duverger looks at the way women vote. His argument is somewhat spurious 
here. On the one hand, he asserts that the differences are almost 
negligible, yet on the other he goes to some pains to show that there 
are differences. By doing so, he gives them an importance that contra­
dicts his claim that they are very slight. He is forced to some degree 
to concede that the differences affect only a small proportion of 
women because he states that most married couples vote the same way. 
Therefore any differences between the sexes depend on those of unmarried 
men and women and the 10 percent or so of married couples who do not 
vote the same way.
The problem with this argument - that we need not consider 
those women who vote the same way as their husbands - is that it 
assumes they vote the same way either because they simply follow their 
husband's choice, or because the influences on the wife's choice are 
exactly the same as those factors influencing the husband's. Yet 
political scientists do not generally assume that everyone who votes
*7 rr
for a particular party does so for the same reasons. D
Duverger considers the married women who vote the same way as 
their husbands only in the context of who influences whom. The evidence 
is from one very small survey of 56 women and 27 men in France.
Duverger says that it is not possible from this survey to state defin­
itely which way the process of influence goes, but nevertheless the 
figures 'give a fairly clear pointer', as 'nearly a third of the women 
questioned stated that they were not interested in politics themselves 
and preferred to rely on their husbands' judgment. No man gave such
33 A similar dismissal of women is made by R.E. Renneker, in 'Some
psychodynamic aspects of voting behavior', 1959. He does not bother 
discussing the women because they 'shared the political views of 
their husbands, or if unmarried, their fathers'. (p.410)
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54a reply.’ Another one-fifth said they voted the same way 'to avoid 
arguments', while only one man answered this way. This evidence
'suggests that it is the husband and not the wife who decides which way
35the couple will vote'.
Although Duverger has hedged his conclusion with words like
'fairly clear pointer' and 'suggests', and notes that the sample is
'much too small', he nevertheless gives this 'evidence' considerable
weight. In the general conclusions he states that the only difference
between the sexes is 'marital authority in political matters', as the
unanimity in voting between husband and wife tends to stem from the'sub-
36mission to the will of the husband'. But the evidence he bases this 
on is questionable as, apart from the small sample size, Duverger has 
misinterpreted the data. His figure of 'nearly a third' is in fact 15 
women of 56, which is 27 percent, not 30 percent as given in the table. 
Further, these women who prefer to rely on their husbands' judgment are 
actually classified in the table as 'Not concerned with politics and 
have confidence in husband's opinions', which is rather different from 
submitting to the will of the husband. The most popular reason for 
voting the same way was that they had the same views on life in general, 
with 21 women (38 percent) giving this reason. Duverger, it seems, has 
interpreted the data to suit his own purposes: to provide an answer to a 
question he considers to be vital, namely, does the husband influence 
the wife or vice versa. But he ignores the other possibility, that 
neither may be influenced by the other. If any interpretation of the 
data is possible, it is that the couples vote the same way because they
34 Duverger, The Political Role of Women, 1955, p. 49 and table 7, p. 48
35 ibid., p. 49
36 Duverger, ibid., p. 122.
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have similar interests. It is being less than scientifically 
objective to conclude from the survey that it is the husband who
decides which way the couple will vote.
A similar process of argument, of asserting that in general
differences are small while also asserting that particular differences
are important enough to discuss at length, is used in the next part
of the discussion concerning direction and stability of voting
behaviour. Duverger first states that
such differences in electoral behaviour as are 
to be seen between the sexes are never very 
considerable and that,on the whole, men and 
women vote on much the same lines.
This statement is immediately followed by a subheading proclaiming 
’The More Conservative Character of the Woman’s Vote', under which
Duverger notes that 'there seems to be little doubt that the woman's
39vote is more conservative'. Just which part of the page are we to 
believe? Perhaps we should look at the figures.
It is immediately apparent when we look at the tables that 
Duverger has engaged in statistical sophistry, as he has presented 
the figures in such a way that differences between the sexes are 
exaggerated. The relevant sections of the tables are reproduced 
below:40
37 This explanation is more likely when it is taken into account 
that people marry each other because they do get along and do 
have interests in common. Table 7, p. 48, provides more evidence 
of the 'similarities of interest' argument in different forms.
Madge Dawson, in Graduate and Married. 1965, makes a similar point 
in opposing Duverger. She suggests the similarity of married 
couples in voting may be 'part of a complex of identity of interests 
within their marriage', (p.81).
38 Duverger, The Political Role of Women, 1955, p. 50.
39 Ibid., p. 50.
40 Ibid., Table 8 p. 50 and Table 9, p. 51.
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Tables from 'The Political Role of Women*, 1949 Figures, Norway
Table 8 Table 9
Women Men Women Men
% % % %
Communists 3 6 24 76
Socialists 47 52 40 60
Agrarians 10 11.5 38 62
Liberals 14 16 40 60
Christian People 8 3 65 35
Conservatives 18 11.5 53 47
Both tables are describing the same distribution of votes.
The difference is that in Table 8 the percentages add down the columns
to 100%, while in Table 9 the percentages add across the rows. But
while the figures in Table 9 are not incorrect, they are misleading
for two reasons. Firstly, from Table 8 we see that the differences
41between the sexes, although they exist, are not very large. There 
is a difference of 5 percentage points among the Socialist voters,
2 percentage points among the Liberals, and so on. But when we look 
at Table 9, the first difference becomes one of 20 percentage points, 
as does the second.
Alternatively, if one were to consider just the figures from 
Table 9, one would conclude that the men are far more likely to vote 
Communist than are the women - 76 percent of the Communist Party 
supporters are men, and only 26 percent are women. But in fact, as we 
see from Table 8, only a small fraction of both sexes vote Communist. 
While it is true to say that more men than women vote Communist, we 
must take into account the fact that we are making a comparison between 
only 6 percent of the men and 3 percent of the women.
41 Duverger does not give significance tests, nor does he give the 
number of people involved, so such tests cannot be calculated.
The figures are from a survey, however, rather than from the whole 
of the Norwegan electorate.
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The example concerning the Communist Party demonstrates the 
second fault, an oversight that leads to an even greater exaggeration 
of the differences. From Table 9 we see that the proportion of men 
to women who vote Communist is about 3 to 1 (76% to 24%). Yet from 
Table 8, the proportion is only 2 to 1 (6% to 3%). Which is the 
correct figure? The answer is that in absolute terms, three times as 
many men as women vote Communist, but in relative terms, only twice 
as many men as women do. Duverger has not taken into account the fact 
that there are, in absolute terms, more men than women voting. Thus 
any proportional difference in which there are relatively more men 
than women voting for a particular party is exaggerated.
Conversely, when there are relatively more women than men voting 
for a particular party, the proportional difference is understated.
For example, from Table 8 we see that almost three times as many women 
as men vote Christian People (8% to 3%), but from Table 9, the proport­
ion is less than 2 to 1 (65% to 35%). It is important to note that 
the first fault still remains, so that a difference of 5 percentage 
points becomes one of 30 percentage points.
The figures presented in Table 9, therefore, are misleading to 
the point of being meaningless. What is more, they do not convey 
any further information than that given in Table 8. All they have 
done is exaggerate the differences between the sexes. This means 
that Duverger's interpretation, that 'the difference in voting between 
the sexes . . .  is still large', is questionable. We would need
significance tests to determine whether we could regard a difference 
of, say 8 percentage points between the men and the women who support
the parties of the Left (Socialists and Communists) as 'large'. But
certainly the differences are not as large as Duverger tries to make
out they are.
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The figures are even more misleading in the next table (Table 10), 
which give voting figures from surveys in France. The figures are 
presented in the second way only, showing for each party the proportions 
of male and female voters. Absolute numbers voting are not given for 
either sex, nor do we have any idea of the relative support for each 
party. Therefore any interpretation that they show the greater conserv­
atism of women should be regarded as suspect. Duverger says only that 
the sex difference is 'less clearly defined' than in Norway.
For Germany, Duverger presents 11 pages of tables, giving the
sex breakdown in elections from as far back as 1919, but makes very
little comment on these results. Looking at the most recent figures,
in 1953 the Christian Democrats were supported by 37.9 percent of the
men, and 45.5 percent of the women, while the Socialists were supported
by 31.7 percent of the men and 'only' 26.6 percent of the women.
These figures, says Duverger, 'confirm those previously recorded. The
parties of the Left (Socialists and Communists) are unpopular with the 
42women'. "The figures also show that women were more likely than men 
to support the Christian parties.
Duverger looks at two more items concerning the woman's vote:
one is its stability, on which it seems that the woman's vote is no
more unstable than the man's. The second item concerns sensitivity to
personalities. A 1943 French survey asked the question 'When you vote,
are you influenced more by the personality of the candidates appearing
on the list, or by the programme of the party to which these candidates 
43belong?' The survey found that 39 percent of the women and 32 percent
42 Duverger, The Political Role of Women, 1955, p. 65. But with a 
difference of 5 percentage points, one could add that the Socialists 
are hardly very popular with the men either! Nor is the Communist 
Party very popular with either sex, being supported by 1.6% of the 
women and 2.9% of the men.
43 Ibid., p .70.
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of the men mentioned personality, which Duverger says is ’quite a 
large difference'. However, he also notes that both sexes were more 
affected by the programme, with 41 percent of women and 51 percent of 
men nominating it. Also in regard to personalities, Duverger notes that 
it is not true that women are more likely to favour dictatorships: in 
1933 fewer women than men voted for the National Socialist party in 
Germany.
Duverger concludes this chapter by reiterating that 'Upon the
44whole, women vote much as men do'. So it seems that he is putting 
forward two messages; one is that there is a difference between the 
voting behaviour of women and men, the other is that the difference 
is very slight. Unfortunately, as we shall see, later researchers 
have been more inclined to take and cite the first message, rather than 
the second.
The general conclusions to the study should be mentioned, because
it is in this part that Duverger's often-cited quotation appears.
As mentioned before, he starts the discussion of conclusions by noting
that differences between the sexes in electoral behaviour are small
and that 'There is nothing here to suggest an essential peculiarity
in woman's nature or a fundamental difference in men's and women's 
45behaviour'. This is apart from marital authority and the 'submission 
to the will of the husband'.^ He qualifies this by stating that 
observations in support of this may be superficial, as we do not know
44 Duverger, The Political Role of Women, 1955, p. 72. He notes also 
that we should not conclude from this that the woman's vote has 
had no political influence.
45 Ibid., p. 122.
46 Ibid., p. 122. I hope I have demonstrated that this is not 
supported by the data he presents.
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who has the real authority in the household. Duverger also notes that 
the part played by women in government is extremely small, and there 
is a progressive decline in their influence as higher levels are 
reached. When women do appear in government, they tend to be in areas 
such as health, education, housing, and so on - those areas which 
are often considered to be of special interest to women.
The reasons for this, says Duverger, lie both in male opposition, 
which he deplores, and in women's weak resistance to such opposition. 
The traditional role of women means they exist in a closed and limited 
world, and this conflicts with having an interest in politics where 
it is important to see things in a larger sphere, and where problems 
must be stated in general terms. Furthermore, the general structure 
of society, the psychological and social environment, creates diff­
iculties :
If the majority of women are little attracted 
to political careers, it is because everything 
tends to turn them away from them; if they allow 
politics to remain essentially a man’s business, 
it is because everything conduces to this belief,
tradition, family life, education, religion and literature. From birtn, women are involved in 
a system which tends to make them think of 
themselves as feminine. ^
However, the fundamental obstacle to women's political involve­
ment, continues Duverger, is their dependence on men. Democracy 
requires that political activity is 'essentially adult', which
'presupposes that anyone engaging in it takes full responsibility
4 8for his fate and does not leave it to another to decide for him’. 
Paternalism is incompatible with democracy. Rut ,
4 7 Duverger, The Political Role of Women, 1955, p. 129. 
48 Ibid., p . 129.
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while women have, legally, ceased to be minors, 
they still have the mentality of minors in many 
fields and, particularly in politics, they usually 
accept paternalism on the part of men. The man 
husband, fiance, lover or myth - is the mediator 
between them and the political world.**-
Support for this claim is given in the nexi: sentence: ' ‘When things
go wrong, women blane their husbands, men blame the government" is 
a fairly apt summing up of this basic attitude. And evidence for 
this is from an analysis of sentimental women's magazines in France, 
which exist to provide escapism for those women who are in inferior 
social and economic positions. Men faced with similar circumstances 
turn to revolutionary parties or to trade- unions.
This argument of fuverger's is rather odd. It is hard to believe
that it is anything more than speculation because he provides so little
concrete evidence to support any of it. Even the first part, which
foreshadows the arguments of today's feminists - that it is the 
social system that has kept women in a position of inferiority - is
little more than commentary. The statements on democracy may theor­
etical 1)' be correct, but the implications and conclusions he draws
from them are blatantly wrong. While many women may not conform to 
the ideal of taking responsibility for their own decision, it is naive 
to think that every man does. Most people rely to some extent on 
others when they form an opinion, whether the others be family, friends, 
public figures, or political commentators reporting through the media. 
There is no evidence whatsoever that every woman has a man to act as 
a mediator between her and the political world; Duverger himself 
concedes that we do not really know who has authority in the home.
But this is what Duverger speculated, and later researchers 
have taken it as a conclusion based on evidence from the book. As we
49 Duverger, The Political Role of Women, 1955, p. 129.
50 Ibid., p. 129.
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have seen, such a conclusion is completely unjustified. In fact the 
argument is unworthy of Duverger because he does have an understanding 
of the problems facing women in a patriarchal society. He concludes 
the text of the book by stating that changes in legislation are not 
enough to change the structure of society;v/e need to awaken in women 
a sense of their own independence. It is even more important to
fight against the deeply-rooted belief in the
natural inferiority of women, based on physio­logical or psycho-physiological considerations
. . . There is no more an inferior sex than 
there are inferior races or inferior classes.
But there is a sex, and there are classes and 
races, who have come to believe in their 
inferiority because they have been persuaded 
of it in justification of their subordinate 
position in society. *
Meanwhile in England, two researchers were following the tradition
of the American electoral studies. Milne and Mackenzie studied the
Bristol electorate during the 1951 British general election, and
produced Straight Fight. They returned to the area to study the 1955
election and in 1958 they published Marginal Seat 1955, based on a
survey of 528 electors. Rather than tracing the development of thought
between the two studies, I shall concentrate on the latter as it cites
52some of the findings already discussed.
The sample size in this study is rather small to expect to find 
many statistically meaningful sex differences, and general trends or 
tendencies only can be reported. On the direction of the vote, the 
authors find that 'There was a slight - and, in this case, statistically
51 Duverger, The Political Role of Women, 1955, p. 130. Duverger 
cites de Beauvoir. We can note somewhat cynically that these 
latter statements are never quoted by other researchers: they only 
ever quote the 'mentality of minors' statement.
52 The authors regard the Erie County study as their book's 'most 
eminent ancestor', and also make reference to Voting and to
The Voter Decides. Milne § Mackenzie, Marginal Seat 1955, p. 2.
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non-significant - tendency for women to be more pro-Conservative than
53men'. Class affects men and women equally; that is, the proportions 
of men and women voting Conservative are almost the same in both the
highest and the lowest social classes.^ As regards non-voting, the 
authors do not give the difference between the sexes but the overall 
figure of abstentions is 9 per cent.
There is a difference between the sexes in self-reported interest 
in the election, with 63 per cent of the women and 83 per cent of the 
men saying they are 'interested1. This difference varies according to 
the person's subjective social class. Thus in the middle class (the 
highest one), 81 per cent of men and 79 per cent of women say they are 
interested in the election; in the lower middle class, the figures be­
come 87 per cent and 73 per cent - a difference of 14 percentage points; 
in the working class the difference increases to 27 percentage points, 
with 83 per cent of the men but only 56 per cent of the women claiming 
to be interested in the election.
Milne and Mackenzie comment on this by saying:
"his finding is very much in accord with general 
knowledge. The typical working-class woman does 
not usually have enough leisure to take time off 
for politics, and she often tends to leave her 
political decisions to her husband. Better-off 
women, who usually vote in conformity with their 
social class - i.e. Conservative - have more time 
for outside interests and activities.55
Presumably the typical working-class woman does not have much leisure 
time because she is more likely to be employed outside the home, while 
the typical better-off woman has more leisure time because she is less
53 Milne § Mackenzie, Marginal Seat 1955, p. 54
54 This contrasts with Berelson et al's finding that women are less 
affected by social class than are men. See above, p. 16.
55 ibid., p . 69
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likely to be employed. If this is so, Milne and Mackenzie's 
explanation is an interesting one because it conflicts directly with 
Duverger's. Thus if a woman works, either she has more contacts with 
the outside world so she can become integrated into the political 
world (Duverger) or she no longer has time to take an interest in 
politics (Milne and Mackenzie). Alternatively, if she stays at home 
she has time enough for outside interests, (Milne and Mackenzie) 
or else she lives in such a small, isolated world that she lives her 
political life vicariously, through her husband the political mediator 
(Duverger). Such a contradiction suggests that the researchers really 
do not know what is the true situation, but speculate to suit their 
purposes and explain their findings.
The next sex difference that Milne and Mackenzie note concerns 
opinion leaders, that is, those people who said both that they dis­
cussed politics and that they were more likely to be asked their views 
on politics, compared with people they knew. Overall, 13 per cent of 
the sample were classified this way: 19 per cent of the men but only 
5 per cent of the women were opinion leaders. Milne and Mackenzie 
attribute this to 'men's greater mobility as well as the specific male 
advantage that politics is a "man's subject"'.^ However they do not 
elaborate on this or say what evidence ihey have that politics is a 
man's subject.
This argument is returned to in the chapter entitled 'The 
electors' account of why they voted as they did'. 480 voters were 
asked their reasons for voting, from which it seems 'images are much
56 Milne and Mackenzie, Marginal Seat 1955, p. 147.
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57more important in determining voting behaviour than are issues'.
The Labour voters saw Labour as being for the working class, while
Conservative supporters saw their party's image in terms of the ability
of its leaders, and in terms of free enterprise. Thirty-five people
mentioned personal contacts, and of these, 26 were influenced by their
spouse. Further, 24 were wives influenced by their husbands. 'This
finding', say the authorsconfirms ihe accepted view that some women,
believing politics and elections to be a man's job, are particularly
S 8easy to influence in this respect'.
It should be noted that if all these women are simply passively
accepting what their husbands tell them, the proportion of easily
influenceable wives is small, being around 10 per cent of women in the
sample. It is not at all clear, however, that these women are just being
told how to vote: Milne and Mackenzie give as an example of a woman
who is particularly easy to influence, a female floater who said
I decided to vote Labour on the way to the poll.
I couldn't see anything different in any of the 
parties, so I decided to vote as my husband does 
for the sake of harmony in the home.59
In other words, the parties' campaigns have failed to make an impression
on this woman, so she feels it does not matter which one she votes for.
Her grounds for choosing Labour thus become pragmatic, to keep the peace
at home. Surely there is no evidence here that this woman sees
politics and elections as a man's job. Yet this quotation is used to
bolster the image, particularly as it is similar to the one that
Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet cite.
57 Milne § Mackenzie, Marginal Seat 1955, p. 159
58 ibid., p . 162. At least they qualify the statement by use of
the word 'some'.
59 ibid., p . 162.
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Finally there is mention of influence of one partner on the other 
when a change of party choice occurs. Milne and MacKenzie state that 
the number of married floaters is too small to support any firm 
hypothesis. Nevertheless, when there was a change from Conservative 
to Labour, it was usually a wife changing in line with her husband:
’The tendency was for husbands to lead and for wives to follow’.60 
The authors do not mention figures, but it seems from an earlier table 
that only 12 people changed their vote between 1951 and 1955 from 
Conservative to Labour. It is unlikely that all 12, or even a majority, 
were female and married to men who had earlier changed their allegiance 
in the same direction. But it is from such 'conclusions', even 
tentatively proposed, that the picture of women's political roles is 
constructed, or rather, fabricated.
The next person to be considered in the construction process is 
Robert Lane, another frequently-cited author. I have discussed at 
length elsewhere the flaws in Lane's argument,so will only summarise 
his views and note the links with the other researchers. Lane looks at 
various studies, some from as far back as 1924, and at least one is 
based on a very small s a m p l e . H e  advances some propositions including 
the following:
60 Milne and MacKenzie, Marginal Seat 1955, p. 163. The authors refer 
to Duverger, but it is not clear why they refer to the particular 
pages they do. Duverger is discussing the fact that in times of 
political crises women are not more likely to change their electoral
choices than are men. He is also discussing the finding that women 
are only marginally more affected by personalities than are men; there 
is nothing to support or refute Milne £ Mackenzie's rather shaky claim 
that husbands lead and wives follow.
61 J. Morgan,'Women and political socialisation; fact and fantasy in 
Easton and Dennis, and in Lane', 1974.
62 To illustrate the difference in the nature of political interests 
of men and women, Lane cites March's study of 32 women.
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The culture emphasises moral, dependent, and 
politically less competent images of women which 
reduce their partisanship and sense of political 
effectiveness and define a less active political 
role for them.
Women are slightly less likely to include voting 
among their social duties and have slight, but 
declining, cultural reinforcement for this inter­
pretation .
A moralized political orientation characteristic 
of women, arising from maternal responsibilities, 
exclusion from more socially valued areas of 
activity, and narrower orbits, tends to focus 
female political attention upon persons and 
peripheral 'reform* issues.^3
The evidence that Lane draws these propositions from, however, 
is not very adequate. Part of the picture is speculation, and seems 
to be based on what Lane thinks is the case, while the factual evidence 
provided is by no means conclusive. To illustrate this, we can look 
at Lane's discussion of those works that have been considered above.
Duverger is mentioned only once, in relation to the F.uropean 
finding that women vote less than men. While this is one of Duverger's
findings, it should be kept in mind that the difference is small and 
Duverger does not make as much out of it as Lane then does. Lane uses 
this finding as the basis for discussing the idea that some women 
regard voting as a male activity. Three of the quotations he gives 
to support this are from the 1940 study by Lazarsfeld, Berelson and 
Gaudet.^
In relation to reasons for non-voting, Lane cites the Campbell, 
Gurin and Miller finding on sense of citizen duty. The original 
researchers say that there is virtually no sex difference, but Lane 
sees that there is a difference worth talking about: 'the fact that
63 R. Lane, Political Life, 1959, pp. 215-216. As pointed out in my 
article, these 'propositions' seem to be transformed into concrete 
evidence, both by Lane and by later researchers citing him.
64 Yet another example of anecdotal material used in relation to women.
there is a difference as large as 5 per cent between the men and 
the women who fail to see a duty to vote under many circumstances 
is significant'^*5 Even when the researchers deny a difference 
exists, there is no guarantee that an enterprising commentator, 
wanting to prove a point, will agree with them!
Lane cites the same authors as evidence of the 'relatively 
greater candidate orientation of women', and suggests that women's 
moralism may account for such candidate orientation. This means that 
'women, more than others, contribute to the personification of politics 
both in the United States and abroad'.^
This is a prime example of the construction and reinforcement
of the image. Lane accepts without question a finding which, as we
6 7have seen, is very questionable - that women are more candidate- 
oriented. lie adds to this his theory (unsubstantiated) that women 
have a more moralistic orientation towards politics, using it as an 
explanation of the Campbell et al finding, and draws the conclusion 
that women personify politics. The interrelation of two types of 
'evidence' such as this tends to give each of them more credibility.
Finally Lane takes another finding of Campbell, Gurin and Miller 
and exaggerates its importance - yet another way of helping to 
fabricate the image. The finding concerns the difference in sense 
of political efficacy. As efficacy is measured by, among other things, 
the feeling that 'I am important enough to have officials pay attention
65 Lane, Political Life, 1959, p. 211. The figures given by Campbell, 
Gurin and Miller in The Voter Decides, p. 197, for sense of citizen 
duty are:
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Male %
High
44
Medium
48
Low
7 100%
Female % 42 44 12 100%
66 Lane, ibid., p. 213. One wonders if the 'others' in the sentence 
are anything more than men!
67 See above, pp. 18-19.
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to me', Lane interprets the Campbell et al findings as 'We would not
6 8expect women to rate high, and the scores show this'. Lane does not
give Campbell et al's figures; the reader takes on trust that the
figures are proof of 'the low sense of political efficacy that character- 
69izes women'. The figures are in fact that 17 percent of men and
23 percent of women have a low sense of political efficacy, while
75 percent of women (compared with 82 percent of men) have at least
70a medium sense of efficacy. Thus Lane continues in the tradition
71started by Lazarsfeld et al: a finding for some women becomes, by
implication, applicable to all women.
The next study to be considered does not commit the sins of mis­
quoting, misinterpreting or exaggerating previous findings because 
in its section on sex differences it does not cite any other findings.
However, as we have encountered two of the authors previously, we 
can assume they are aware of the tradition regarding the political 
role of women, and to some extent it will influence their interpretation. 
The study is the second by Michigan University's Survey Research 
Center, this time carried out by Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 
and published in 1960 under the title The American Voter.
In the section on the electoral effects of social characteristics, 
the authors discuss the findings relating to sex, based on their 
surveys of 3,300 people interviewed in 1952 and 1956. They found 
firstly that voting participation for women was 10 percent below that
for men. The difference is least at higher levels of education, and in
68 Lane, Political Life, 1959, p.213
69 Ibid., p. 213.
70 Campbell, Gurin and Miller, The Voter Decides, 1954, p. 191.
71 See above, p. 13.
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fact among those with college education and under 35, marginally more 
women than men voted. A similar effect is found concerning sense of 
political involvement in the current political situation: fewer women 
than men express such a sense of involvement, although at higher 
education levels the differences are virtually obliterated or reversed.
They report that there are no differences between the sexes
regarding strong identification with a political party, and only a 
marginal difference in sense of citizen duty. However, there is a
difference in sense of political efficacy; the men are more likely
than the women to feel that they can cope with the complexities of
politics and to believe that their participation carries some weight
in the political process. The figures certainly show this difference.
On a scale of high, medium and low efficacy, for those with grade
school education only (28 percent of the sample), 37 percent of the
men and 67 percent of the women had a low sense of political efficacy.
The corresponding figures for those with college education (18 percent
of the sample) were 5 percent and 7 percent respectively. However,
in the latter group, 83 percent of the men but only 68 percent of
72
the women had a high sense of efficacy.
The next difference the authors note is in 'levels of concept­
ualization of politics'. The respondents were asked what they liked
and disliked about the parties, and their answerw were judged and 
classified as relating to ideology, group benefit, nature of the times, 
or having no issue content. The men tend to 'cluster at the more 
sophisticated levels', although the authors do not note that this
72 Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, The American Voter, 1960, 
p. 491, non-south sample only. These findings are similar to 
those found in the Survey Research Center's previous study, reported 
in The Voter Decides. See above, p. 19.
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difference is again least at the highest education level. Finally 
they claim that women are ’more Republican', but note that the diff­
erence is small, being around 3-5 percent.
My interpretation of these findings would be that there are 
some small differences between the sexes in voting turnout, sense of 
political involvement, possibly in sense of citizen duty, and in 
conceptualisation of politics. These differences are interrelated 
with education so that at higher educational levels they largely 
disappear. The only difference that does seem to persist at all 
educational levels is in sense of political efficacy. This suggests 
two questions for further study: why are there differences between 
the sexes at low levels of education but not at high levels, and why 
do more women than men have less of a sense of political efficacy?
Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes have interspersed the 
reports of the findings with their own explanations. They suggest that
a century ago there were clear-cut political roles, with men being
the political agents. The'newer political sex roles’ are not yet fully
accepted and this is why there is a difference in voting turnout.74
The difference in political efficacy is directly related to
role beliefs that presume the woman to be a 
submissive partner. The man is expected to be 
dominant in action directed toward the world 
outside his family; the woman is to accept his 
leadership passively. She is not expected, 
therefore, to see herself as an effective 
agent in politics.
73 The classification is rather subjective. See Campbell, Converse, 
Miller f, Stokes, The American Voter, 1960, pp. 222-227. In such 
judgmental situations, it is always possible that coders will use 
external cues such as sex to help them code an answer; that is, they 
may code similar answers differently for male and female respondents.
74 In the sense that a century ago, women did not have the vote, they 
are of course right. But the argument, which has similarities with 
those of Puvergcr and Lane, is little more than speculation.
75 Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, ibid., p. 490.
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No support is offered for this rather sweeping generalisation. 
The authors miss the obvious clue: not only do women have less of a 
sense of political efficacy, but so do those men and women who have 
low education. Perhaps the reality of the situation, rather than sex 
role expectations, is the important factor. That is, people have a
sense of low efficacy when in fact they have low efficacy, when they
7 fiknow they can have little effect on the political process.0
The authors then argue that the sex differences are really greater 
than the figures suggest. Voting turnout is not a good indicator, 
as there are many women who respond to civic expectations about voting, 
but nevertheless show personal indifference and dependence upon their 
husbands' judgment. They do not say just how many women feel this 
way, nor how they know that there are 'many women' and presumably few 
men, who vote but are not interested in politics beyond that. However 
they spend some time discussing this group of women, so much so that 
the reader tends to lose sight of the fact that they are not talking 
about all women, maybe not even a majority. In fact they have not 
even established whether such a group of women exists. Nevertheless, 
they describe such a woman thus: she does not pay much attention to 
politics other than voting, but leaves the sifting of information up 
to her husband and abides by his decision. Her vote is probably
n 7stable over time, even though she has little information.
The information that she brings to bear on 'her' 
choice is indeed fragmentary, because it is 
second hand. Since the partisan decision is 
anchored not in these fragments but in the fuller 
political understanding of the husband, it may 
have greater stability over a period of time 
than we would otherwise suspect.^
76 This interpretation is supported by the findings in The Voter 
Decides, where low political efficacy was correlated with low socio­
economic status. See above, p. 19.
77 This is a reference to a common, though questionable, findinn that 
people who change party preferences or who make up their minds very 
late also have little information and low interest.
78 Campbell, Converse, Miller § Stokes, The American Voter, 1960, p.492
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The authors recognise that not all women fall into the ’dependent
wife' category: ’Of course some wives, as well as some women without
husbands, do strike out on their own politically.' These women may
still be influenced by their primary groups but 'at least they have
no single and immediate source of political cues that they are satis-
79fied to accept without question, as wives often have'. ‘ This group
of 'liberated' women is rather small, the authors argue, as it cannot
offset the sex difference in levels of conceptualisation of politics
which arise'because of female willingness to leave political matters 
. 80to men'.
But just where are these dependent wives, and how many are there? 
Perhaps we can define them according to the authors' criteria. Firstly 
they do not have college education presumably, because there are no 
differences between the sexes in sense of political involvement at 
this level. Secondly, they must have little or no interest in politics 
other than voting, and probably a low sense of political efficacy 
(so far we are already down to only 33 percent of the women in the 
sample). Thirdly they must be married. Fourthly, and this imposes 
the greatest limitation, they must be married to men who are interested 
in politics, have a 'fuller political understanding' and more sophist­
icated political information than their wives, sift through political 
information before deciding how to vote, hand down their decision to 
their wives, and get their political information first hand (so their 
wives can get it second hand). Yet the authors have not done a survey 
of husbands and wives, so they can give no evidence as to the number 
of these women, if indeed they exist. Even the combination of high
79 Campbell, Converse, Miller 5 Stokes, The American Voter, I960, p.492.
80 Ibid., p. 492. The argument has similarities with Duverger's 
'male mediators'.
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political interest and first-hand involvement of the husband, and low 
political interest of the wife, would probably ensure that the numbers
O 1were very small. This underlines the type of error the researchers 
make: although there may be many women who are apathetic regarding 
politics, we must not overlook the fact that there are many men who 
are just as apathetic. Both parts of the image of the dependent wife 
and her politicallly sophisticated husband need to be queried.
The next study that is worth briefly mentioning is another compar­
ative one, Almond and Verba's The Civic Culture, published in 1963.
This study, conducted in the late 1950's, looked at electoral behaviour 
in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Mexico. 
Regarding women and political orientation, the authors cite Duverger 
and Lane as sources of their image of women, which is that
women differ from men in their political behavior 
only in being somewhat more frequently apathetic, 
parochial, conservative, and sensitive to the 
personality, emotional and esthetic aspects of 
political life and electoral campaigns.
The evidence the authors present is a set of tables on political 
information, political interest (measured by following both politics
81 It is not at all clear what is implied in getting one's information 
second-hand. Most people have contact with political affairs only 
through the media and through discussions with other people such
as relatives, friends,and work colleagues. In all of these, the 
person could be said to be receiving political information through 
a mediator, and thus receiving it 'second-hand'. There is a diff­
erence in receiving political information from work colleagues and 
from one's husband only if in the first, an exchange of ideas takes
place, while in the second, the wife is simply passively accepting 
the husband's ideas. Yet despite claims to the contrary, the
authors have not demonstrated that women take no active part in 
conversations with their husbands.
82 G.A. Almond $ S. Verba, The Civic Culture, 1963, p. 388. To keep 
the record straight, my analyses of Duverger and Lane above suggest 
that the only parts of this image that are substantiated are the 
greater frequency of apathy (measured by voting turnout) and conserv­
atism (measured by voting for conservative parties).
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and campaigns), sense of duty to participate in one's local community, 
and subjective political competence. The only part of their picture, 
therefore, that they give evidence to support is the greater degree 
of apathy of women - that is, if lack of interest in politics and 
in election campaigns is a measure of apathy. The parochialism, 
conservatism, personalising, and emotional aspects of the image are 
neither supported nor refuted: they are just ignored.
Considering just the figures presented for the United States,
all we can conclude from them is that more men than women score highly
on political knowledge (59 percent to 40 percent respectively score
highly), and fewer men than women say they follow neither politics
nor election campaigns (16 percent of men and 23 percent of women
follow neither). The authors say, therefore, that Lane's picture of
the culture emphasising the moral, dependent and politically less
competent images of women is less applicable in America than in other
countries. They also reject Duverger's 'mentality of minors' statement
as being an 'essentially continental European comment', although they
83cannot resist quoting it. Of course the evidence that Almond and 
Verba have presented, on knowledge, interest, sense of duty to partic­
ipate, and subjective political competence, has little relevance either 
to Lane's statement or to Duverger's, unless the lower political 
knowledge found among more women than men indicates the 'mentality of 
minors' - in which case a fair proportion of men would be just as 
juvenile.
A final study to be considered is Milbrath's Political Participation. 
It is one of the more recent works and is often cited as being a summary 
of the research on sex differences. The quotation from Milbrath at
83 See footnote 51 above, p. 33. The statement is quoted in Almond 
 ^Verba, The Civic Culture, 1963, p.398.
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the beginning of this chapter sums up his position, that men are more 
likely to participate in politics than are women. This 'thoroughly 
substantiated' finding is due to the tradition that politics is a man's 
business, says Milbrath. And evidence of the tradition is that 'a 
favourite excuse for not wishing to be interviewed is to claim that the 
husband takes care of the family politics'. The tradition also exists 
in the mind of one State Representative from Arkansas, and his
O Cchauvinistic comment about women meddling in politics is quoted.00 
The third evidence is from a number of studies he cites, including 
Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet; Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee; Lane; 
and Almond and Verba.
The sex difference in political participation is slowly being eroded
by economic and social factors says Milbrath, citing Almond and Verba as
evidence. But, he continues, this erosion does not mean that women are
becoming independent of men in their political views:
A good deal of solid evidence still suggests that 
wives follow their husband's lead in politics (some­
times vice versa), or at least that husband and on
wi£e tend to support the same parties and candidates.°7
There is a world of difference between saying that a couple 
support the same party and saying that the wife follows the husband.
The solid evidence, as we have seen, supports only the proposition that
84 L.W. Milbrath, Political Participation, 1965, p. 135. Apart from the 
fact that no numbers are given, we can ask to what extent a con­
venient excuse for getting out of an interview is truly represen­
tative of the actual situation.
85 Ibid., p. 136. This is the only anecdotal material in the chapter. 
The quote is: 'We dont have that trouble up in Perry County. When 
our women get too nosey about something that doesn't concern them,
we get another cow to milk or get them a little more garden to tend.'
86 He cites 17 other references, of which only 6 have been published 
since 1960. It is of course possible that’ there may be evidence
in some of these studies that does substantiate his claims and 
is more valid than the studies that I have concentrated on. How­ever, I have chosen these studies that are regarded ps among
the most important and consequently are the most frequently cited.
87 Ibid., p. 136. Emphasis in original.
48
husbands and wives vote the same way. There is no conclusive evidence 
that wives follow their husbands' lead, particularly as such a statement 
implicates if not all, then at least a majority of wives. It is not sur­
prising that Milbrath states this, however, as one of the sources he 
cites in support is Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, while the
O Oother sources cited hardly provide solid evidence. °
Milbrath's discussion on sex differences, like Lane's, draws its 
material from studies of previous researchers rather than providing any 
new statistical evidence. It is included in my review to illustrate 
how the image of women's political roles is constructed. To extend the 
building imagery, we can regard the statistical evidence as the bricks, 
their interpretation as the mortar, and their consolidation by writers 
such as Milbrath and Lane as structural reinforcement. I have been en­
deavouring to show that the construction is not a very solid one. This 
is a result both of faulty foundations and poor quality mortar; the con­
ventional wisdom that the researchers use to build on has prejudiced 
their building, while the interpretations of the data, influenced by their 
preconceptions, are often distortions or even scientifically unsound.
The objection could be raised that these studies are out of date 
and the image of the passive, non-participating w'omen meekly following 
their husbands' lead is no longer regarded as true. Unfortunately the 
writers that I have discussed are still cited by later researchers, even 
when these researchers produce findings that conflict with part of the 
picture. Without going into great detail, some examples should illustrate 
the point.
88 Milbrath, Political Participation, 1965, p. 136. The other sources 
he cites are the Norwegian part of Puverger's study, a 1959 
article and a book published in 1937.
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Firstly, the writers in the political socialisation school 
use the findings as background to their discussions of sex differences 
among children. Thus we have Hess and Torney in 1967 noting the 
following findings: women are more interested in candidates that in 
issues (Campbell, Gurin § Miller); women evaluate political objects on 
a lower level of conceptualisation, and feel less competent and effi­
cacious in political authority (both from Campbell, Converse, Miller 
Stokes); women are less interested in political matters and elections 
(Berelson, Lazarsfeld 6 McPhee); and women vote less frequently (no 
source cited). It is not surprising, then, that Hess and Torney inter­
pret their somewhat questionable findings on children to show that boys 
are ahead in attitude development, girls personalise more, and boys 
have a greater interest in politics.
Easton and Dennis cite only Lane and Milbrath in their discussion 
of sex differences in children. Their preconceptions are thus: 'The 
rates of female participation have been found to be significantly lower 
than those of men; and the direction of female voting has somewhat less 
clearly been found to be more conservative.^ I have discussed in de­
tail elsewhere the bias in their interpretation of the findings that 
results from Faston and Dennis's preconceptions.^*
89 The findings are somewhat questionable in the light of Vaillancourt's 
discovery that children may not even have stable attitudes.
Vaillancourt found an alarming degree of instability among children 
of all apes. For example, only half the children nominated the same 
party affiliation after a two-month interval. See 'Stability of 
children's survey responses^, 1973. A reading of the Hess and Torney 
findings uncovers similar faults to those in Easton and Dennis, dis­
cussed in J. Morgan, 'Women and political socialisation: fact and fantasy in Easton and Dennis, and in Lane'. 1974 As an example, Hess
and Torney found that the children's interest in politics decreased 
with age.
90 D. Easton $ J. Dennis, Children in the Political System, 1969, p. 335.
91 J. Morgan, op. cit.
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Jennings and Langton, in a discussion of the relative importance
of mothers and fathers in the formation of attitudes of their children}
do at least recognise that the research of the past is not all that solid.
They cite Campbell, Gurin Miller, Berelson et al, and Lane, on male
dominance and say that the 'fairly slender soundings' are buttressed by
'one's intuitive notions and observations about the place of the sexes
in American party politics. As with most occupations men occupy the
elite positions . . . Politics is conventionally thought of as sex-
appropriate for men, whereas doubts and ambiguities prevail regarding 
Q?women.'
Two years later we find Jennings, this time with Niemi, still talk­
ing about the conventional wisdom that says politics is a man's world, and 
this is evidenced by 'the greater male participation at the mass level
Q 7and preponderant occupancy of political positions at the elite level'.
And evidence for this has been documented by Jennings and Thomas in an
earlier article.^ This article in fact cites the same old references:
Duverger, Lane, Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, and Almond and
Verba are cited as support for the statement that 'the existence of sex
differences in political behaviour is one of the most consistently
reported findings in empirical studies of political socialization,
95voting behaviour and political participation'. Specific sex
differences are noted: women have a lower sense of political involve­
ment and political efficacy, and are less sophisticated in their
92 M.K. Jennings 5 K. Langton, 'Mothers versus fathers: the formation 
of political orientations among the young Americans', 1969, pp.330-1
93 M.K. Jennings $ R.G. Niemi, 'The division of political labor 
between mothers and fathers', 1971, p. 70
94 M.K. Jennings N. Thomas, 'Men and women in party elites: 
social roles and political resources', 1968.
95 ibid., p. 469. They cite three other studies, a 1948 one by Gosnell,
and two by Greenstein, one of which I briefly discuss in 'Women 
and political socialisation', 1974.
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conceptualisation of politics (Campbell, Converse, Miller § Stokes); 
women are more apathetic, emotional and sensitive to personality 
(Almond and Verba); females personalise more (Hess and Torney); and 
women are more receptive to familial influence (Berelson, Lazarsfeld 
and McPhee). Jennings and Thomas say 'The basic conclusion which one 
derives from the literature is quite clear: men participate more, have a 
higher intensity of involvement, and view politics somewhat differently'.^
No wonder, with all this weight of research-citing, that Dowse and
q nHughes in 1971 say that sex differences are 'solidly researched'.
These authors cite Duverger and Milbrath as evidence that women partici­
pate less, vote less, know less, have less interest and are more con­
servative than men. Almost in contradiction to this, the authors note 
that middle-class women of higher educational levels differ only margin­
ally from similar middle-class men, and Milbrath, Almond and Verba, and 
Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, are cited as evidence.
Still the process of citing, re-citing, building up the evidence 
continues. In Australia in 1969, Wilson and Western compare Australian 
findings that 'men are likely to participate more, both actively and
96 Jennings $ Thomas, 'Men and women in party elites: social roles and 
political resources', 1968, p. 471.
97 R.E. Dowse h J.A. Hughes, 'Girls, boys and politics', 1971, p.53.
The full quote is given at the beginning of this chapter. It should 
be noted too that both Lane and Milbrath, by summing up the findings, 
then become part of the solid research themselves: the process is 
self-perpetuating.
98 I say 'almost in contradiction' because middle-class women are not 
such a small minority of the female population, yet the earlier 
statement again implies that most women vote less, participate less, 
etc. Perhaps the conflict can be resolved if 'higher educational 
levels' means very high levels, such as university training. It is 
unclear from the context whether 'middle-class women of higher edu­
cational levels' refers to such a group, or whether middle-class 
women are being defined as those with higher educational levels such 
as completing secondary school at least, in which case they would com­
prise a fair proportion of the population, at least in the US and 
Australia, and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom.
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passively, than women', with similar findings in the United States,
99as noted by Milbrath. And in November 1974 a New Zealand researcher 
quotes Duverger's 'mentality of minors' statement as 'the case against
women', and cites Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, that men are 
more likely to believe they can cope with the complexities of politics 
and have some degree of political efficacy.1- °
Before we make the mistake that so many of the researchers make, 
that by repeating a proposition often enough we will come to believe 
it is a solid fact, we shall recapitulate the findings and non-findings. 
The factual differences, the sound bricks in the construction, are the 
following. There is a difference between the sexes in voting turnout, 
a difference which varies with country, with type of election and 
with time.101 Associated with this, there is a difference in professed 
interest in the election or in politics generally. Again the figures 
vary. One American study found 33 percent of men and 23 percent of
women having a great interest; a British study found proportions of
J 10283 percent and 63 percent respectively being interested.
Another finding connected with this is in sense of political 
involvement, although the difference exists only at lower educational
99 P.R. Wilson § J.S. Western, 'Participation in politics: a prelim­
inary analysis', 1969, p. 105.
100 N.S. Roberts, 'The female kiwi as a political animal', 1974, p.200. 
He also cites an article by E. Costantini $ K. Craik, entitled 
'Women as politicians', 1972. These researchers find the liter­
ature 'replete with evidence' on sex differences in political 
behaviour. As expected when this is pursued, the evidence comes 
from the same authors that I have been discussing: Campbell, 
Converse, Miller $ Stokes; Berelson, Lazarsfeld $ McPhee; Puverger; 
Lane; Almond § Verba; Milbrath; Hess $ Torney; Campbell, Curin
§ Miller.
101 Lazarsfeld et al, Campbell, Gurin 8 Miller; Duverger; Lane (citing 
others); Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes. Of course no 
comparisons can be made in Australia, where voting is compulsory. 
Here, failure to vote involves a conscious decision of whether to 
risk a fine, and is thus qualitatively different from failing to 
vote because of apathy.
102 Lazarsfeld et al; Milne § Mackenzie; Almond § Verba.
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103levels. One study reports a difference in political knowledge of 
19 percentage p o i n t s . T w o  studies find a difference in sense of 
political efficacy, although only one gives overall figures: 35 percent 
of men and 20 percent of women had a high sense of efficacy.
The British study looked at opinion leaders and found a difference,
106with 19 percent of men and 5 percent of women being thus classified.
There are a couple of findings which are reported by Duverger
but are either not supported by other researchers, or are supported
in a very questionable way. One refers to the direction of the vote:
Duverger found differences of the order of 5 to 8 percentage points
that indicate that more women than men vote for Conservative parties 
(and possibly for religious parties). However, other studies have
found no difference (or no significant difference) in party preference
or vote division. These findings may not be contradictory as Duverger's
relate to Europe, and the others relate to the United States and the 
107United Kingdom.
The second relates to women personalising politics, or being more 
sensitive to candidates. The only factual difference is Duverger's 
report of a 1943 French survey, based on unknown numbers. However, 
Duverger himself also reports a finding which may be counted against 
this, that women are not more attracted to dictatorships than are men.
103 Campbell, Converse, Miller $ Stokes.
104 Almond $ Verba.
105 Campbell, Gurin § Miller; Campbell, Converse, Miller Stokes; 
and Lane, but he exaggerates its importance.
106 Milne £ Mackenzie.
Berelson et al; Milne § Mackenzie; Campbell, Gurin § Miller; 
Campbell, Converse, Miller § Stokes. Duverger does not place 
much reliance on the findings, and says there is no fundamental 
difference.
107
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There is one finding reported only by Campbell, Converse, Miller 
and Stokes, on which it is difficult to pass judgment. This concerns 
the idea that women have less sophisticated conceptualisations of 
politics. While there is a difference between the sexes, according
to the researchers' figures, I have suggested that its measurement 
is somewhat subjective. The finding really needs to be repeated 
(rather than just quoted) before we can regard it as a solid fact.
The lack of a difference between the sexes occurs, as has just 
been mentioned, in relation to direction of vote and in personalising 
politics. It also occurs in sense of citizen duty.-*^ These non­
differences are mentioned because other researchers claim that there 
are differences in these areas, but give no factual evidence.
Finally there is the faulty mortar, the speculation and prejudiced 
interpretation that have helped to make the image of women's political 
roles a fabrication rather than a construction. The inadequately
109substantiated claims include the following: politics is a man's world; 
women's attitudes towards politics differ in nature to men's, for 
example in that they are more moralistic;men dominate in political
matters and/or tell their wives how to vote;** women are more candidate-
112 113oriented; women are more conservative; and women have less of a
sense of citizen duty.*^
108 Campbell, Gurin 5 Miller; Campbell, Converse, Miller $ Stokes. 
Actually, the latter note there is a 'marginal' difference, which
I am taking to be closer to no difference than to being a signif­icant difference.
109 Lazarsfeld et al; Milne Mackenzie; Lane; Campbell, Converse, Miller $ Stokes; Milbrath.
110 Lane; Almond $ Verba, citing Lane. They are contradicted by 
Duverger and by Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, at least.
111 Lazarsfeld et al; Berelson et al; Duverger; Milne Mackenzie; 
Campbell, Converse, Miller 5 Stokes; Milbrath.
112 Campbell, Gurin § Miller; Lane (citing them); Almond $ Verba 
(citing Lane).
113 Duverger (at times); Almond £ Verba (citing Duverger).
114 Lane, misinterpreting Campbell, Gurin $ Miller.
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The above summary forms the framework for the second part of the 
study, the analysis of the Australian survey. To the extent that it 
is possible, I will look at the data from this survey with an eye 
to confirming or negating the factual evidence found by the overseas 
researchers, and to see whether any substance can be given to those 
findings that I consider to be dubious. Unfortunately this is limited 
in places because the relevant questions have not been asked in the 
Aitkin and Kahan survey. Thus the analysis will look at the following 
hypotheses:
Women are less interested in politics and elections than are men.
Women are less knowledgeable about political matters than are men.
Women participate less than men do.
Political sex differences are smaller at higher levels of education.
Women are more conservative than men.
Women follow their husbands in matters such as voting.
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3 THE AUSTRALIAN SITUATION: SEX DIFFERENCES IN POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR
This chapter will provide some Australian-made factual bricks 
which can be used in the construction of an image of women's political 
roles. The data are taken from the second wave of the Australian 
Survey Project, a survey conducted by Don Aitkin and Michael Kahan 
just after the Federal election in October 1969.^ Details of the 
sampling procedure are given in their monograph, Drawing a Sample of 
the Australian Electorate. In this survey, 1873 people aged 21 and 
over from all Australian States were interviewed; 975 were men and
3898 were women.
Before considering the data, a couple of methodological problems 
need to be raised. The first concerns the existence and stability of
attitudes. The social-psychological concept of an attitude is that
it is an 'enduring system of positive or negative evaluations, emotional
feelings, and pro or con action tendencies with respect to a social
object'.^ If we accept this definition as applying to political
1 This election saw the Liberal-Country Party coalition, led by 
John Gorton, returned to government. Their majority was reduced, 
an indication of the trend that brought about the ALP victory at 
the following election in 1972.
2 M. Kahan $ D. Aitkin, Drawing a Sample of the Australian Electorate, 
1968. Background to the Australian political scene, and the politcal 
climate prevailing at the time of the election, can be found m
D. Aitkin, Stability and Change in Australian Politics, forthcoming, 
and in D. Aitkin fT M. Kahan, "Australia' , 1974. Both-”of these also 
discuss the general findings of the Australian Survey Project.
3 The survey included a number of respondents who had been interviewed 
in the first wave of the project, in 1967. My analysis is confined 
to just the 1969 survey, and does not distinguish between those 
being interviewed for the first time and those being reinterviewed.
4 D.Krech, R.S. Crutchfield 5 E. Ballachey, Individual in Society, 1962, 
p. 177. Ouoted in P. Vai1lancourt, 'Stability of children's survey 
responses', 1973,p.376; emphasis added. We could extend this 
definition to include potentially enduring attitudes, to cover a 
situation where an attitude has recently been formed, or changed
but will become an enduring attitude.
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attitudes, we need to question whether a spontaneous answer to a 
forced-choice question, made under various social pressures, really 
represents a meaningful attitude. It may be that the researchers 
are tapping nothing more than random responses or 'non-attitudes'.^
Non-attitudes exist because although people may be 'vibrant 
bundles of attitudes', it is unlikely that most wold hold well-thought 
out opinions on every issue that political scientists can think to 
ask about. Often people have no need to develop an attitude or even 
to care very much about matters that are beyond their immediate 
environment. When they are asked about their political attitudes in 
a survey, they are suddenly required to give direct responses on issues 
which they may have never had to think about before, let alone give 
an opinion on. They do not admit that they have no opinion, however. 
They feel they ought to have an attitude - even though they may not 
see politics as important to them, they may still see that it ought 
to be important, so they ought to have an attitude/’ An interview 
tends to have the atmosphere of an intelligence test about it, and 
the respondent might think that a 'no opinion' answer could be inter- 
preted as an indication of low intelligence. Another social pressure 
is that asking people for their opinion on an issue is a form of 
flattery. Probably some people respond simply because for once someone 
is interested in what they think, and is prepared to take their opinion 
seriously.
5 A 'non-attitude' is to be distinguished from 'no attitude'. The
latter occurs when the respondent admits that he or she does not 
have an attitude on a particular issue. A non-attitude occurs when 
the person does state a position, but is doing so only in response 
to the fact that the question is being asked, rather than because 
it reflects a meaningful, thought-out, and thus enduring belief.
6 Its importance is reinforced by the fact that it is being asked about.
7 It is a case of impression management: the respondent wants to 
appear knowledgeable to the interviewer. See E. Goffman, The 
Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, 1972.
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Thus the attitudes that the political scientists think they are 
measuring may be no more than 'non-attitudes'. An approximate guide 
to the extent of non-attitudes is obtained by measuring attitude stabil­
ity by use of a panel. Philip Converse in an article entitles 'Atti­
tudes and non-attitudes: continuation of a dialogue', studied panels 
interviewed at two-year intervals on questions concerning major issues
O
of public policy. He found very low test-retest correlations of 
government to free enterprise, he estimated that only 20 per cent had 
real and stable attitudes. Of the remaining 80 per cent however only a 
minority said they had no opinion; the rest gave an opinion but answered 
in what seemed to be a random fashion. Converse suggests that the random 
group consisted of people with no real attitudes on the issue, who 
nevertheless felt they ought to have an opinion. Similarly in Britain, 
Butler and Stokes found instability of attitudes on the issue of 
nationalisation, an issue they had expected to be a salient one for the 
majority of people. However, only 50 per cent of people interviewed on 
three occasions held the same broad view, of either supporting or
9opposing further nationalisation.
As the Australian Survey Project included a group of respondents 
interviewed in 1967 and re-interviewed in 1969, the degree of stabil­
ity of some of the attitudes can be gauged. Unfortunately, at the time 
of my analysis of the 1969 data, the data from the panel were not avail­
able. Therefore, although I can be aware of possible shortcomings in
8 P.F. Converse, 'Attitudes and non-attitudes: continuation of a
dialogue', 1970. The surveys were carried out by the Survey Research 
Center between 1956 and I960, and probably involve some of the data 
on which The American Voter is based.
D.I.. Butler 5 D.F. Stokes, Political Change in Britain, 1969, Chap. 8. 
Other studies of response stability and instability include:
S. Iyengar, 'The problems of response stability: some correlates 
and consequences', 1975; S. Verba et al, 'Public opinion and the war 
in Vietnam', 1967; P.M. Vaillancourt, 'Stability of children's survey
responses' 1973* L. Bogart, 'No opinion, don't know, and maybe no 
answer', 1967. From these studies it seems that instability is not
correlated with degree of political interest or information.
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the data, I am not able to overcome them. If the Australian situation
is similar to that overseas, we could expect a relatively high degree
of stability for party identification, but r somewlat lower degree for
10opinion questions and questions on political interest.
The second methodological problem is common to studies using 
aggregated data, and concerns interpretation of the data. What does it
mean when we find, for example, that 46 per cent of women and 58 per 
cent of men vote for the German Christian Democrat Party, or that 33 per 
cent of men and 23 per cent of women profess ’great interest' in an 
election? Duverger interpreted the first statement as showing that women 
are more conservative than men, ^  while Lazarsfeld et al interpreted 
the second as shewing that women were less in eiested in politics. "
But leaving aside the question of definitions of conservatism 
and interest in politics, surely we have not established that women 
are more conservative or less interested than men. All we have found
is that more women than men vote conservative, and fewer women than 
men claim a high degree of interest in politics. Being 'more conserv­
ative' implies that conservatism is a scale attribute, which it may 
well be. But if this is so, the degree of conservatism of a person 
or group of persons can only be measured if we have several items 
from which we can construct a scale. A scale attribute cannot be 
measured by a discrete item such as party choice, yet the researchers
10 Converse, 'Attitudes and non-attitudes: continuation of a dialogue', 
found the highest test-rete:->t correlation, of .80, was for affect 
towards major parties. He also found that stressing to the 
respondents to say so if they had no opinion on a particular issue 
was relatively effective. However, Aitkin and Kahan included this 
alternative explicitly only in 4 of the 14 opinion questions.
11 Duverger, The Political Role of Women, 1955, p. 53. Similarly, 
Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes in The American Voter,1960, 
found that women are 'more Republican', whatever that may mean.
12 Lazarsfeld, Berelson £ Gaudet, The People's Choice, 1948, p. 45.
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usually base their conclusions of the greater conservatism of women 
on one or more such discrete items. The same argument applies to 
other characteristics such as interest, apathy, political efficacy, 
and so on.
It is a neat summary to be able to say that women are more 
conservative and less interested in politics than are men. But such 
statements become generalisations, implicating the majority of women. 
Furthermore, they are not necessarily correct, although the reverse
situation may be. For example, suppose we constructed a scale of 
conservatism for women and for men, and discovered that according to 
some average (mean, median or mode), women were more conservative than
men. If the difference were large enough, and if conservatism affected 
party choice, we could expect to observe that more women than men voted
for a conservative party.
Such an observed difference is not necessarily due to a differ­
ence between the sexes on degree of conservatism, however. There may
be other reasons. For example, there may be a variable which influences
party choice and which is present in differing proportions among women 
13and men. Alternatively, it may be incorrect to assume that the 
social factors that influence political behaviour are correlated in 
the same way for both sexes. In fact there is some evidence that the 
relationship between educational status and party choice is different 
for women and for men, as will be seen below.
However, it is prejudging the issue to suggest explanations for
observed differences when we have not yet determined what differences
exist. It is time to look at the Australian data to try to discover
where the differences and similarities in political behaviour and att­
itudes of men and women lie.
13 This is what underlies arguments such as that ’women are "more
Republican" because they live longer'. (Campbell, Converse, Miller 
§ Stokes).
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The analysis of the Australian Survey Project data focuses on 
those areas where past researchers have suggested that differences 
exist. Thus the data are discussed under the topics of political 
interest, political knowledge, political participation, conservatism, 
and influence of spouse. The point made above in relation to conserv­
atism, that there may be a third variable that produces an observed 
difference between the sexes, rather than sex itself, is applicable 
to any political characteristic. Thus the background variables of the 
two groups should be considered, to discover whether any influences 
need to be controlled for.
3.1 Social Characteristics and Sex
As regards the age distribution, there is no significant differ-
14ence between the men and women in the sample. The greatest difference
is that 18 percent of the men and 14 percent of the women are under
25. The differences in the other age groups of 10-year intervals
are only 1 or 2 percentage points. There is also no significant
difference in marital status, with 77 percent of the men and 74 per
cent of the women being married. ^  Marginally more men than women
are migrants, with 23 percent of the men being born overseas, compared
with 18 percent of the women. Religion, also, provides a marginal
difference. The proportion of non-Catholics is almost equal (71 per
cent of men, 70 percent of women), but there are more Catholic women
than Catholic men (27 percent and 22 percent respectively), and 
conversely, more men than women who have no religion (7 percent to
14 Significance or insignificance of differences between distributions
is tested by the chi-square statistic, calculated in the computer 
program. For a description of chi-square, see J.P. Guilford, 
Fundamental Statistics in Psychology and education, 1965, Chap. 11.
15 The test of significance of a difference between proportions is 
described in Guilford, ibid., pp. 185-186.
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3 percent respectively). The differences in place of birth and in
religion are statistically significant (p less than,01). There is
no need, therefore, to control for age or marital status except when
they are specifically involved, as in husband-wife discussions. The
influence of religion and place of birth will be discussed in relation
16to party identification.
It is a basic assumption of this thesis that there is a differ­
ence in the status of men and women, brought about by the fact that 
sex is a social variable and not just a biological one. While the 
notion of status is a much-debated concept in sociology, for the 
present purpose it can be regarded as comprising an objective element 
- the socio-economic determinants - and a subjective element of 
prestige, The difference in the status of men and women occurs in 
both these factors. There is a difference in prestige, or subjective 
evaluation of self and others, in that men are regarded both by men
and women as being more important than, if not actually superior 
1 7to, women. Women also rank lower on socio-economic status than do 
men, on the three measures commonly used, occupation, income and 
education. Women are concentrated in occupations that have a lower
16 There are no a priori reasons why religion should affect the other 
items that will be discussed. However, there may be reasons for 
excluding foreign-born respondents, on the grounds that they may 
not be fully integrated into the Australian political scene.
But to do this accurately, we should really exclude only those 
migrants who have recently arrived, which would be somewhat less 
than the total number of migrants in the sample.
17 Evidence of this is presented by many feminist writers. A factual 
demonstration is provided by Broverman et al, in 'Sex-role stereo­
types: a current appraisal'; 1972. The authors found that clearly 
defined sex role stereotypes still exist, with both desirable and 
undesirable traits. The masculine stereotype has far more desir­
able than undesirable traits, but the feminine stereotype has the 
reverse. This means that women tend to have more negative self- 
concepts than men do, and that both sexes evaluate women at a 
lower level than men.
63
status than those that are male-dominated; women earn less than men,
both on average and even when they are in the same job,^ and fewer
l c)women than men reach high education levels.
The Australian Survey Project data do not provide figures on the
extent of the differences in occupational and income status, because
20these questions were asked only of the head of the household.
Only 163 women were classified as heads of their household. This 
means that for 82 percent of the women, the occupational and income 
status coded for them is really that of their husband or father. In 
comparison, the status of the father (or, for a few cases, the wife) 
of 35 percent of the men is recorded. Thus for the majority of the 
sample, male occupational and income statuses are being coded. As 
a result, the distribution of occupational status of the male and 
female respondents is very similar. 49 percent of both sexes are 
classified as in the white collar occupations (professional, semi- 
professional and clerical). 49 percent of the men and45 percent of
the women are classified as blue collar, being in skilled, semi-skilled 
and unskilled occupations.
18 The Equal Pay Case was decided in June 1969, but this only provided for equal pay for equal work, rather than for work of
equal value - an important distinction when the occupational 
segregation of the sexes is taken into account. Even those doing 
the same jobs did not automatically get equal pay. though. The 
Public Service, for example, did not bring in full equality until 1972.
19 Evidence on all these items for the United States is provided by
K. Amundsen, The Silenced Majority, 1971, Chaps. 1-3. In Australia, 
facta and figures on income and occupation are given bv M. Power,’The wages of sex', 1974, and 'h'oman^ s work is never done - by 
men', 1974. Encel et al, Women and Society, 1974, provide further 
Australian evidence on income, occupation and education.
20 Defined as the person owning or responsible for buying or renting 
the house. However, convention prevails: by implication there is 
only one head of each household, so even when the house is jointly 
owned by husband and wife, the information is asked of the husband 
of the married female respondents. In this survey, even widows 
and divorced women were not regarded as the head of the household
if they received any income such as maintenance, or a pension from their late husband’s employer.
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Ke cannot measure the occupational status of the women in the 
sample, therefore. All we can determine is their employment status - 
whether they are working full-time, part-time, or not at all. However, 
there is a further problem. Because of an error in coding, employment 
status is accurate only for those respondents, male and female, who 
are not the head of the household.‘~ We cannot find out the employment
status of the female heads of households, although it would seem
22reasonable to assume that the majority are working full-time. Among 
the women who are non-heads, we find well over half - 62 percent - 
are not working outside the home. Only 23 percent are in full-time 
employment, while another 15 percent are working part-time.
The employment status of these women gives us an indication of
their income status. Only those working full-time - 39 percent of
the sample at the most, if we assume that all female heads are working 
full-time - are likely to come anywhere near male income rates. If, as
is more likely, not all female heads are working, the proportion is
even lower. And the majority of these women will probably be earning
23less than their male counterparts. Thus although we cannot give
precise figures concerning the occupational and income status of women
in the sample, we can conclude that almost certainly it is, on average,
24lower than the status of men.
21 Employment status of respondents is coded separately for those res­
pondents who are heads, and those who are not. The first classific­
ation is linked to an incorrect classification that has overstated 
the number of respondents who are heads. However the second is
taken from two questions that were asked only of non-head respondents. 
The error means also that no comparable figures on the employment 
status of the men can be given.
22 The majority would be single women living alone; others would be 
widowed, separated or divorced, and would probably be working at 
least part-time.
23 M. Power, 'The wages of sex', 1974, found that the ratio of female
to male median full-time incomes is around .60, even when educational 
qualifications and occupational categories are controlled for.
24 Jt could be argued that women benefit from their husbands' status, 
and of course many married women do have a higher standard of living
(cont. next page.)
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More accurate figures can be given on the third dimension of 
socio-economic status, that of education. Again we find that the 
women are less likely to be in the higher education groups. Education 
levels are grouped as follows: primary, which includes those who went 
no further than primary school; secondary, which includes those who 
undertook some secondary schooling or who finished secondary school;
and tertiary, involving those who went on to technical college or to 
university. The education distribution for each sex is given in the
following table.
Table 1: Educational Status of Respondents
Women Men
% %
Primary 29 29
Secondary 57 41
Tertiary 14 50
100 100
(898) (975)
While many women get through primary and secondary school, only
9 chalf as many women as men proceed to tertiary education.“ The diff­
erence is statistically significant (p less than .01). Thus on the 
three commonly used indicators of socio-economic status - occupation, 
income and education - we find that the average levels are lower for 
women than for men. As the data do not provide very adequate measures
24 (cont.) than their own objective socio-economic status would
allow. But we need to question to what extent dependence upon 
another detracts from this relatively high status, particularly as 
separation, divorce and widowhood emphasise its insecure nature.
25 The reason for this can no longer be accepted to be because women 
are less intelligent than men. The explanation must lie with social- 
factors: women are not encouraged to undertake training for careers, 
and are even discouraged from appearing too intelligent. Despite 
the fact that in Australia, over 409, of the female workforce is 
married, the feminine stereotype that provides only for the career 
of housewife and mother, is still widely believed. See A. Summers,
’Women’s consciousness of their role structure', 1970, and B. Friedan, 
The Feminine Mystique, 1972, Chap. 7.
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of the first two indicators, socio-economic status will be represented
9 Aonly by educational status.~D
Not only does the education distribution differ between men and
27women, education is found to be correlated with party identification. 
The classification of party identification is: non-Labor - those who 
say they identify with the Liberal Party, the Country Party, the DLP, 
or 'other' parties (the last includes only 11 respondents); Labor - 
those who say they identify with the ALP; no party - those who say 
they do not identify with any party, and a small number who refused 
to say, or did not know. The interrelation of sex, education and party 
preference is shown in the following table.
Table 2: Educational Status and Party Identification
Primary Secondary Tertiary Total
F M F M F M F M
% % % % % % % %
Non-Labor 39 38 59 47 68 48 55 45
Labor 53 53 33 39 23 35 37 42
No party 8 9 8 14 9 17 8 13
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
(261) (280) (508) (399) (129) (296) (898)(975)
The effect of education on party identification is stronger for 
women than it is for men. Among those with primary education, 38 per 
cent of both sexes say they identify with the non-Labor parties.
Secondary education produces proportions of 59 percent of women and 
47 percent of men identifying this way. At tertiary level, the proportion
26 This is no serious omission. Education, as would be expected, is 
found to be correlated with occupation and income, and is acceptable 
as a measure of socio-economic status in its own right.
27 The question on party identification is the usual one asked in
the electoral studies overseas (with appropriate changes of party 
name): Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as
Liberal, Labor, Country Party or D.L.P.? (Q 37(a)) Party identif­
ication was originally defined as 'the sense of personal attachment 
which the individual feels toward the (party) of his choice'. 
Campbell, Curin $ Miller, The Voter Decides, 1954, pp. 88-89
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of female non-Labor identifiers has risen to 68 percent, but male 
non-Labor identifiers make up only 48 percent. Between the lowest and 
the highest education levels, therefore, there is a difference of 
30 percentage points for the women, but only 10 percentage points for 
the men. A similar effect is found on the proportions identifying 
with the ALP. From primary to tertiary education, the proportion of 
female ALP supporters falls by 31 percentage points, but male supporters 
decrease by only 18 percentage points.
The purpose of the discussion of these variables - the demographic 
ones and those measuring socio-economic status - was to discern whether 
there are any factors that may be producing differences between the 
sexes, rather than the sex difference as such. Demographic differences, 
in age, marital status, and so on, were found to be too small to make 
much impact, and occupation and income differences could not be accur­
ately measured. However, there is a difference is education levels.
But we cannot simply control for education because it is clear from
Table 2 that sex and education are interdependent. Education affects 
party identification in different ways for each sex. For both sexes,
the higher the education level, the greater is the propensity to identify
with the non-Labor parties, but the relationship is stronger for women
than for men.
We can hypothesise, then, that any differences between the sexes 
may arise not just because of a difference is socio-economic status, 
but because there is some other difference between the sexes, at least
28 Madge Dawson found similar proportions among her sample of 1070
married women graduates: Liberal-Country Party, DLP and Independent
supporters comprised 74% of the sample, 13% were Labor supporters 
and 12% were swinging voters. See Graduate and Married, 1965,p.73.
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to the extent that increased education has different effects on the
political outlooks of women and men. Why this difference exists is
29open to speculation.
3.2 Political Interest
Previous research has provided figures to show that women are
less likely than men to say they are interested in politics and in 
30elections. The data from the Australian Survey Project generally 
support this. There are a few ways of gauging political interest 
from the survey. The most relevant ones are self-evaluated degree 
of political interest in politics generally and in the election cam­
paign, the following of political news in the media, and the discussion 
of politics. Keeping in mind the social pressures that may lead
people to claim a higher degree of interest than they actually have,
31the figures on claimed political interest are as follows.
Table 3: Interest in Politics
Primary Secondary Tertiary Total
F M F M F M F M
% % % 0 , % % %
Good deal 13 23 15 25 25 34 16 27
Some 34 45 49 49 50 49 45 48
Not much 41 24 32 20 23 15 33 20
None 12 6 4 6 2 3 6 5
D.K. * 1 - - - - * *
100 ' 99** 100 100 100 101 1 00 100
(261) (280)'(508)(399) (129) (296) (898) (975)
* less than ..5%
** percentages do not add to 100 because of rounding errors
29 This is not to suggest that increased education causes a change in 
political outlook. A person will not necessarily become more conserv­
ative with increased education. All we have shown is that there is
a correlation, rather than a causal relation, between education and 
party identification, and for some unknown reason the correlation is 
stronger for women than for men.
30 See above, p. 52
31 Question 32: How much interest do you general])' have in what’s going
on in politics, a good deal,some, not much or none?
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From this table we see that a greater proportion of men than 
women claim to have a good deal of interest in politics (27 per 
cent to 16 per cent). Education has an effect on both sexes, and 
in the same direction, is that the proportion of those who have 
a good deal of interest in politics increases with increased 
education. When we control for education we find there is still 
a significant difference (p less than .01) between the sexes at
primary and secondary education levels, but the difference is not
32significant at the tertiary level.
The figures are even more striking when we look at the 
proportions who say they have not much, or no interest in politics.
Among those with primary education only, 53 percent of the women 
but only 30 percent of the men give these answers. With secondary 
education, the proportions decrease to 36 percent and 26 percent 
respectively, while with tertiary education the figures are 
25 percent and 16 percent respectively. In other words, there is 
a difference between the sexes in interest in politics, and the 
difference (as well as the absolute level) varies with education 
levels. The figures support the hypothesis that sex differences 
are least at the highest education levels.
The second measure of political interest is again a self-
evaluated one, namely interest in the election campaign. The
33data are presented in Table 4.
52 It may seem rather surprising that the difference between the 
sexes at tertiary level is not significant, as the differences 
are of the order of those for primary and secondary levels, 
which are statistically significant. The result comes about 
because of the small number of people who have tertiary education. 
(Chi-square = 6.03, 3 d. of f.; less than the critical value of 7.82)
33 Question 6: How much interest did you have in the election campaign, 
a good deal, some or not much? The wording of this question imposes 
a constraint on those people who had no interest at all in the campaign.
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Table 4: Interest in the Election Campaign
Primary Secondary Tertiary Total
F M F M F M F M
% % % % % % % %
Good deal 22 31 29 37 43 44 29 38
Some 35 34 39 38 35 37 37 37
Not much 43 34 32 25 21 19 33 26
D.K. - - * - 1 - 1 -
100 99 100 100 100 100 100 101
(261) (280) (508) (399) (129)(296) (898) (975)
The pattern found is similar to that for general interest in 
politics, which is what we should expect. Thus there is a difference 
between the sexes, a difference which is significant (p less than .05) 
at the primary and secondary levels, but is not significant at the 
tertiary level. Further, as the educational level increases, so does 
the proportion who say they have a good deal of interest in the campaign. 
We must keep in mind, however, that there is a relatively large number 
of people who are hardly interested in the campaign: a third of the 
women, and a quarter of the men, admit that they have not much interest, 
while more than a third of each sex claim only to have some degree
of interest. This is an indication of a fair amount of apathy, a
34finding which supports overseas findings.
A third measure of political interest, which is not so direct as 
the self-evaluated ones, is the extent to which political news is 
followed in the media. The questionnaire asked whether the respondent 
followed the election campaign on television, in newspapers, and on 
the radio.35 The figures show that television is the most popular 
medium for following political news (at least during the election
34 See for example, Milne Mackenzie, Marginal Seat 1955, p. 67, 
and Almond § Verba, The Civic Culture, 1963, Chap. 13.
35 Questions 1(a), 2(b) and 3(a) respectively.
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campaign), with two-thirds of those with a television set saying they
36followed the campaign. There is no significant difference between 
the sexes: 65 percent of the men and 68 percent of the women said they 
followed the election campaign on television. There is also very little 
variation between education levels.
On the other hand, radio was not used as a source of political in­
formation by the majority of the sample. Only 17 percent of the men and 
19 per cent of the women said they followed the campaign on the radio.
As with television, the sex difference is insignificant, and election
37level produces no major differences.
There is a difference, however, as regards following campaign news 
in newspapers. The proportions who say they followed the election cam­
paign in the papers are as follows:
Table 5: Proportions who followed Campaign in Newspapers
Primary Secondary Tertiary Total
% % % %
Female 46 47 56 48
Male 55 60 71 61
The figures show that at all education levels, more men than women 
say they follow political news in the papers, and the differences 
are significant (p less than .01). It is not obvious why the difference 
between the sexes is so marked for newspapers when there is no sex
36 Only 6% of the sample did not have a television set.
37 Radio may have increased in importance as a source of political 
news since this survey was taken, because of the advent of talk- 
back radio programs. These programs were started in 1967, and while 
they were immediately popular they were not used directly by 
political parties until Labor's 'mini-campaign' in 1971. During 
the 1972 campaign they were used extensively by political leaders.
By this time, a survey showed that 45% of the conversations were 
about political matters, and the majority of the audience (57%)
and the participants (66%) were women. Further, of those partic­
ipants who gave their occupation, 42% said they were housewives.
See D. Aitkin fi A. Norrie, 'Talk back radio and political part­icipation ', 1973.
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difference for the other media. It may be that more men than women have
access to daily papers, particularly as many men buy and read a daily
, . . 38paper on their way to work.
The last measure of political interest is an item which can also
be regarded as a measure of political participation. This is dis-
39cussion of the election with other people. * Almost two-thirds of the 
sample claimed they discussed the election, and again there are vari­
ations with sex and education.
Table 6: Proportion who said they discussed the election
Primary Secondary Tertiary Total
% % % %
Female 44 63 76 60
Male 60 70 79 70
Education and discussions are more highly correlated for women than 
for men, as the increase in the proportion discussing the election 
between primary and tertiary levels is 32 percentage points for the 
women, and only 19 percentage points for the men. Furthermore, the 
difference between the sexes is significant at the primary education 
level (p less than .01) and at the secondary level (p less than .05), 
but it is not significant amongst those with a tertiary education.
These findings on political interest lead us to conclude that there 
is some degree of difference between the sexes, particularly at primary 
and secondary education levels. More men than women say they discussed 
the election with other people and consistent with this, more men 
say they are interested in politics and the campaign. Yet while this is
38 A survey reported in H. Mayer, The Press in Australia 1959, found 
that, depending on the paper, up to one-quarter of men read the 
paper while travelling to work. Only 10% of women read the paper 
elsewhere than at home. However, differential access may not be 
enough to explain the difference between the sexes, as the survey 
also found that around 75% of homes received a paper daily.
39 Question 5(a): Did you talk to other people about the election?
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so, we must still keep in mind that the overall picture is not very en­
couraging, for either sex. Only a minority (22 percent) claim to have 
a good deal of interest in politics, and there is little improvement 
regarding the election campaign, where 34 percent say they have a good
deal of interest.
The majority of people, therefore, do follow campaign news on 
television and even claim to discuss the election, but have at the most 
only 'some' interest in elections and politics. This is so for both the 
men and the women, although more women than men conform to this picture. 
Therefore while we can draw a conclusion such as that 'more men than 
women are interested in politics', a more meaningful conclusion would 
be that neither sex exhibits a high degree of interest. Also, there 
is some support for the hypothesis that sex differences are least at 
highest education levels. On all measures of political interest ex­
cept one there are no significant differences between those men and 
women who have tertiary education.^
3.3 Political Knowledge
Overseas studies and previous Australian ones suggest that we
cannot expect the electorate to have a high degree of complex know-
41ledge about political matters. This is what we find from the 
Australian Survey Project data: on even relatively simple matters,
40 The exception is following campaign news in the papers, This hard­ly invalidates the conclusion that at the highest education level, 
there are virtually no differences between the sexes. It must be
kept in mind though that this conclusion is only a tentative one, 
because it is based on relatively small numbers - 296 men and 129
women have tertiary education.
41 See for example, Almond $ Verba, The Civic Culture, 1965, Chap. 15. 
In Australia, Rawson in Australia Votes, 19bl and Gestern $ Wilson, 
'Politics, participation and attitudes', 1973, found very low levels 
of knowledge on such things as knowledge of one's Federal Member
of Parliament.
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there is widespread ignorance. Although this survey, as with other 
surveys of adult political attitudes, is not meant to be a test of 
knowledge, there are a few questions which reveal the extent of the 
respondent's knowledge or ignorance.
The first question concerns knowledge of the names and parties 
of the candidates who stood in the respondent's electorate in the 
Federal Election held a few weeks previously.^“" The answers were coded 
in the following categories: (a) all names and all party identifi­
cations correct; (b) all names and some parties correct; (c) all names 
but no parties correct; (d) some names and some parties correct;
(e) some names, no parties correct; (f) none correct; (g) no answer or 
don't know. These classifications are regrouped as: high knowledge,
including categories (a) and (b); moderate knowledge involving cate-
43gories (c), (d) and (e); and low knowledge, involving (f) and (g) .
This regrouping gives the following breakdown.
Table 7: Knowledge of candidates and parties
Primary Secondary Tertiary Total
F M F M F M F M
ft % % % % % % %
High 20 19 19 19 19 17 19 19
Moderate 50 60 57 60 64 64 56 61
Low 30 21 24 21 16 19 25 20
100 100 100 100 99 100 100 100
(261)(280) (508) (399) (129) (296) (898) (975)
42 Question 46(a): 'Do you remember the names of the candidates who
stood for Parliament in this electorate?' Fqr each name,give, the respondent was then asked 'And which party does he/she belong to?'
43 The researchers took no account of the fact that some electorates 
would have had a larger number of candidates standing than others 
did. In such cases it would seem reasonable to assume that a 
respondent who knew the names and parties of the major candidates, 
but no others, has the same degree of knowledge as a person who 
knew all the names in an electorate with only two or three 
candidates.
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The proportions who have a 'high’ degree of political know­
ledge hardly vary between the sexes or across educational levels.
There is a trend for there to be more women than men at the low know­
ledge (or more correctly, no knowledge) level, particularly among 
those with primary education only. We again find that education has a 
more marked effect on women than men. However, none of the differ­
ences between the sexes are statistically significant.
More striking than any sex or education difference, however, is
the small proportion of the sample who have a high degree of political
knowledge. Less than one-fifth can correctly name all the candidates
and their parties in an election in which they voted only a matter of 
44
weeks ago. This proportion is virtually the same regardless of sex 
or education. At the other end, a quarter of the women and a fifth of 
the men in the sample could not name any candidate, or could not give 
correct names of any.
A second measure of political knowledge concerns the ability to 
name S e n a t o r s . W e  would expect to find that political knowledge is 
lower on this measure because firstly, there had not been a Senate 
election for two years. Secondly, Senators are elected to represent 
States rather than individual electorates, so they are seen as more 
distant, and thirdly, the Lower House is seen as the place of political 
action, and more political news concerns its actions and its person­
alities than concerns the Senate. The expectation is fulfilled.
Taking, somewhat arbitrarily, knowledge of three or more names of
44 Perhaps this demonstrates not so much the lack of knowledge, but 
the shortness of memory of the respondents. One would hope that 
the proportions who could accurately name the candidates would have 
been higher at the time of the selection, particularly as their 
parties are not listed on the ballot paper.
45 Question 69(a): Do you happen to know the names of any Senators?
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Senators to indicate high knowledge; knowledge of one or two names to be 
moderate knowledge, and namipg none correctly to be low knowledge, we 
get these figures:
Table 8: Knowledge of Names of Senators
The overall picture is that few people know the names of even a 
handful of Senators. Only 6 percent of the women and 14 percent of the 
men can name even three. Further, we find that there is a significant 
difference between the sexes at all education levels (p less than .01). 
While more than half of the men (54 percent) cannot name any Senators, 
over two-thirds of the women (70 percent) display the same amount of 
ignorance.
Both sexes are a little more knowledgeable about the functions of 
the Senate, however. The respondents were asked what the Senate did, 
and how it differed from the House of Representatives. The answers were 
coded according to whether they referred to electora] characteristics, 
constitutional procedures, political evaluation oi othei . Three 
answers could be coded, although only a fifth of the men and a 
twentieth of the women gave more than one response. T]ie first 
responses have the following distribution.
46 Electoral characteristics included proportional representation, 
equal numbers from the States, being an Upper House, and so on. 
Constitutional procedure covered items such as that it approves 
legislation from the House of Representatives, it is a House of
review etc. Political evaluation included having veto power over 
the Lower House, or controlling the Lower House.
High
Moderate
Low
Primary Secondary Tertiary Total 
F M F M F M F M
% % % % % % % %
4 8  5 12 11 23 6 14
17 31 26 33 33 32 24 32
79 62 69 55 56 45 70 54
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Table 9: Knowledge of the functions of the Senate
Female Male
% o
Electoral characteristics 4 8
Constitutional procedure 12 26
Political evaluation 7 10
Other 4 5
D.K., no answer 75 51
100 100
(898) (975)
: figures show that half the men, and nearly three-quarters
of the women are unable to say anything about the functions of the 
Senate. The difference between the sexes is significant (p less than 
.01). This finding, with the one on knowledge of the names of Senators, 
suggests that the Senate is not a salient issue to most people. ^
It is of interest to note that the difference between the sexes is 
significant when knowledge of the Senate is involved, but it is not 
significant when the issue is more relevant, such as with the 
naming of candidates in a recently-held election.
A final measure of political knowledge concerns another issue 
which could be considered to be a salient one, that of Vietnam. The 
respondents were asked, in a forced-choice question, what they felt 
Australia should be doing about Vietnam. They were then asked what 
position they thought the government parties, the ALP, and the DLP held.
47 That it is not salient to many people is indicated firstly by
the fact that a quarter of the sample could not say how they had 
voted at the last Senate election two years ago. Secondly it is 
shown by the high proportion of 'no opinion' answers to a question 
concerning whether the Senate should be abolished. 56% of the sam­
ple said they had no opinion. There was a significant sex differ­
ence too, in that 44% of the women and only 28% of the men had no 
opinion. This also illustrates the point made in the previous chap­
ter, that our opinions transcend our knowledge: only 38% of the sam­
ple could say anything about the functions of the Senate, yet 64% 
gave an opinion as to whether it should be abolished.
48 Questions 18(a), (c), (d) and (e).
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The alternatives presented were:
(A) we should have troops fighting in Vietnam, including conscripts
(B) we should have troops in Vietnam, but only volunteers
(C) we shouldn't have any troops in Vietnam, and only send civilian 
experts
(D) we should stay out of Vietnam altogether.
The respondents' own opinions will be considered later. What 
is of interest here is how accurately they perceived the parties' 
policies on Vietnam. At that time, the Liberal-Country Party govern­
ment held and was implementing policy (A). The Labor Party's official 
policy was (C), although the sending of civilian experts was not 
stressed, so their stand may have been seen as closest to (D)
The DLL's stand was the same as that of the government.
Vietnam seems to be a salient issue to most people as only 
3 percent could not give an opinion of their own. Thus it is not
surprising to find that the majority of the sample accurately per­
ceive the Government's policy. 88 percent of the men, and 82 percent
of the women, nominate position (A) as the government's position.
Only 5 percent of each sex nominate another alternative; the rest 
(7 percent of men, 13 percent of women) say they do not know. 
Controlling for education, the only difference between the sexes that 
is significant (p less that .05) is at the secondary education level. 
There is no significant sex difference among those with primary or 
with tertiary education.
The ALP's position is not so accurately perceived, although the 
overall level of knowledge is still high. Only 20 percent of the men
49 Whit lam had stated in the 1969 campaign that there would be immed­
iate notification to the United States government of intention to 
withdraw all troops, rather than immediate withdrawal as such.
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and 12 percent of the women correctly nominated position (C), al­
though another 60 percent of each sex were nearly correct, in that 
they chose (D). 12 percent of each sex gave a wrong answer, while
9 percent of men and 16 percent of women would not give an answer. 
Again there is no significant difference between the sexes at primary 
or tertiary level, but there is a difference (p less than .01) at 
secondary level. This finding, together with the one on perception 
of government policy, give support to the hypothesis that there are 
no sex differences at the highest education level, but add something 
extra in that there is no difference at the lowest education level 
either.
The findings on political knowledge are thus not very conclusive. 
On an issue that does not seem to be salient, that of the Senate, 
we find widespread ignorance, and we also find a significant and 
relatively large difference between the sexes. However.on two other 
issues that can be regarded as salient, there is no sex difference 
on one (naming House of Representative candidates), while the other 
(perception of parties' stands on Vietnam) has or has no sex differ­
ences, depending on the education level.
3.4 Political Participation
The literature claims that men are more likely to participate 
in politics than are women.^ This is true in one obvious and 
important area, that of political leadership. There has been a 
very small number of women elected to pariiament, both in Australia
50 For example, L. Milbrath, Political Participation, 1965: see
the discussion above, p. 11 and pp. 46-48; P. Western 5 P. Wilson, 
'Politics: participation and attitudes', 1973.
so
and in other countries.^ As we descend the hierarchy from active 
participation through to passive forms, the proportion of women
increases, relative to men. Thus only a tiny fraction of members of 
Federal and State Parliaments have been women, while there is a slightly 
greater proportion of women among local council positions.
At a lower level of participation, that of party membership, the
figures start to improve. Men still dominate in the executive positions
of all parties, except in the Liberal Party in Victoria, where there is
a rule giving equal representation to women at all levels (other than
preselection). Among the rank-and-file members, we find that the
ALP is still male-dominated. It is estimated that men outnumber women
by 3 or 4 to 1. However, in the Liberal Party, the proportion of
52female members approaches that of male members.
It is not possible to obtain the figures on party membership for
53the whole of the sample in the Australian Survey Project. However, 
among a subsection of the sample involving 161 women and 246 men, only 
7 women and 9 men were members of a political party. This represents 
4 percent of each sex. A more accurate measure of active participation,
51 At the time of the survey, there were only 3 women in Federal 
Parliament, all in the Senate. Encel et al, in Women and Qocietv,
1974, p. 245, note that in 1972 there were only 16 women of a total 
of 728 seats in Federal and State Parliaments, that is, 2.2%. In 
1968 there were 178 women in local government, of approximately
7,000 positions, i.e., about 3%. The situation is no better inthe United States; see K. Amundsen, The Silenced Majority, 1971,Chap.4.
52 Encel et al, op. cit. , pp. 254-256, give a summary of the situation 
regarding party membership. The ALP seems to be changing its
attitude towards women, particularly since it has been in government. 
And the number of female ALP members of Federal Parliament"has
increased from none in 1969 to three in 1974.
53 The question 'Have you paid a subscription to any political party 
in the last year?' (N 12(a)) was, for some reason, only asked of 
new respondents, and the information for those respondents who 
had been interviewed in 1967 was not coded with the second wave 
data. I have not had access to panel data. From the first wave 
survey, though, 5% of the sample belonged to a political party.
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rather than membership of a party as such, is whether the person is 
an active member or not. Only 2 women and 3 men in this subsample 
said they took an active part in party work.
A similar measure of active participation concerns working for 
a party during the campaign. Figures from the whole of the sample are
available, and again prove to be negligible. Nine men and seven 
women worked for the Liberal Party, while 17 men and 3 women worked 
for the ALr. While these figures are too small for any statistical 
significance to be placed on them, the trend is in keeping with what 
is known of the parties, that the ALP is male-dominated while the 
Libera] Party has more nearly equal numbers, at least among the rank- 
and-file members.^
A final measure of active political participation comes from a 
question asked in the survey concerning attendance at campaign meetings.*’*’ 
The overwhelming majority of the sample - 97 percent - did not attend 
any meetings. Among those who did, the ALT attracted most, with 30 
men and 3 women attending their meetings. Fight women attended 
Liberal Party meetings, and 4 men did. Three men attended both Liberal 
and ALP meetings, but no women did.
The conclusion to be drawn from the above discussion is that 
there is an extremely low level of active participation in politics 
among both men and women. Amongst the few who are active participants,
there are more men than women. This is particularly so in the ALP, 
and it is so for botn the AL? and the Liberal Party at higher levels
of political power and leadership. Further up the hierarchy, at the
54 P. Rawson, in Australia Votes, 1961, found similar proport ons 
among a sample of party workers interviewed on polling day, 1958, 
in Brisbane. Among ALP workers, 53 were men, 4 were women, while 
the Liberal Party had 20 men and 29 wonen working for it.
55 (Questions 51(a) and (c): Did \ou attend any political meetings
during the campaign? Which party was that?
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level of elected representatives, the number of women participating
is minute. However, it is unfair to conclude from this that men are
more likely to participate in politics than are women, because such
a conclusion suggests that men are even likely to participate. A
better conclusion would be that women are even less likely than men 
are, to participate in politics in an active sense.
So far we have been discussing active participation in politics.
Discussions of political natters and following political news in the
5 6media can be regarded as forms of passive participation. These 
were discussed earlier in relation to political interest, so will 
only be mentioned briefly. We found a relatively high proportion 
of people saying they had discussed the campaign - 60 percent of 
women and 70 percent of men. The sex difference is significant except 
amongst those with tertiary education.
At the level of participation that involves the least activity, 
that of following political news in the media, we fin^ I the highest 
proportion of participants. 73 percent of the men,and 66 percent of 
the women claimed they followed the campaign news in at least two media. 
Although significantly more men than women read about political news 
in the papers (61 percent to 48 percent), a larger proportion of each 
sex followed the campaign on television (65 percent of men and 68 per 
cent of women), and here there was no significant difference between 
the sexes.
In conclusion, we can regard participation as having various 
levels, from the most passive to the most active. The proportions
56 Even voting is a form of participation but in Australia where voting 
is compulsory it is not as meaningful a measure as it is in the 
United States or Britain, where it is not compulsory.
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participating at each level decrease, the more active the level becomes. 
Also, the difference between the sexes increases as we move up the 
hierarchy. Thus there is support for the hypothesis that men are more 
likely to participate in politics than are women, except, perhaps, 
at the most passive levels of participation.
3.5 Conservatism
Part of the conventional wisdom about women's political attitudes, 
at least among lay people, is that women are more conservative than
men. Yet the overseas studies do not place much emphasis on this 
aspect of women's political behaviour. Indeed, some writers point 
out that there is hardly any difference between the sexes, at least 
in direction of vote. For example, Campbell, Converse, Miller and 
Stokes say that there is little partisan difference between the sexes. 
Women are 3-5 percent 'more Republican' but this is due 'not to some­
thing unique in female political assessments, but to aggregate differ- 
ences in other social characteristics between the sexes'. Duverger,
also, found only slight differences in voting behaviour, although as 
shown above, he and later writers citing him have exaggerated the 
difference.^
The problems in trying to support or refute statements such as 
'women are more conservative than men' were discussed earlier. It 
was suggested that conservatism would need to be measured as a scale 
attribute. The Australian data do not provide information that can 
be readily transformed into such a scale, so the hypothesis cannot
57 Campbell, Converse, Miller $ Stokes, The American Voter, 1960, p.493.
58 See above, pp. 23-30. Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, 1963, 
and Easton $ Dennis, Children in the Political System, 1969, are 
examples of researchers who cite Duverger's 'findings' on the 
greater conservatism of women.
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be tested as such. Instead, all that can be done is to look at 
incidences on items such as party identification and various opinion
quest ions.
As regards party identification, there is a sex difference that 
is more clear-cut than those found overseas, although it supports 
previous Australian studies. This is that more women than men say 
they identify with the non-Labor parties, and conversely, fewer women 
than men identify with the ALP. The distribution by sex is presented 
in the following table.
Table 10: Party identification by sex
Female Male
% %
Liberal 45 35
Country Party 7 6
D.L.P. 3 3
Other ★ 1
Total non-Labor 55 45
Labor 37 42
No party 8 13
100 100
(898) (975)
There is a difference between the sexes of 10 percentage points among
the non-Labor supporters, and 5 points among the Labor supporters.
59The difference between the sexes is statistically significant.
Why more women than men vote for the non-Labor parties is not 
clear. Aitkin and Kahan suggest that the differences they found in
59 The differences are similar to those found by previous researchers 
in surveys of single electorates. Burns in Parties and People, 
1961, found in the 1960 La Trobe by-election that 57 % of women
and 44% of men voted ALP, while the non-Labor parties (Liberal, DLP 
and and Republican) received support from 51% of women and 43% 
of men. Rawson found in Parkes before the 1958 Federal election 
a high proportion of undecided voters, and also that 16% of women
and 35% of men supported Labor, while 31% of women and 28% of men 
supported the Liberals. Australia Votes, 1961.
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their 1967 survey, where women showed a 'greater preference for
conservative parties', are because women live longer, have less
60education, work less or earn less. Three of these claims can be 
tested, and are found to be false.
Taking age first, it is obvious that claims such as this one, 
and the one by Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes that women are 
'more Republican' because they live longer, and older people are 
more conservative, cannot be supported by a cross-sectional survey. 
Instead, a longitudinal survey would be needed. These statements
imply that people become more conservative as they grow older, so 
that some Labor supporters (or Democrat supporters) will become
Liberal (or Republican) simply by virtue of their reaching a certain 
age. However, there is little evidence to suggest that people do 
change their party preferences as they grow older.61
There is evidence, however, of a 'generation' effect. New voters
entering the electorate at a time of political significance have been
/
found to support one party rather than another, sometimes in over­
whelming proportions. Years later, as they maintain their first 
loyalties, the effect can still be seen. The generation effect is
60 D. Aitkin 5 M. Kahan, 'Australia', 1974. In the 1967 survey, the 
proportions among those who have a party identification are:
Liberal-Country Party - men 47%, women 58%; ALP - men 50%, women 39%; 
DLP - 3% for each sex. When we omit the people who do not identify
in the 1969 survey, the figures are almost identical to these figures.
61 D. Sears, 'Political behavior', 1969, discusses the lack of evidence 
in his section on later socialisation. Any evidence of increased 
conservatism with age that does exist is to the effect that people 
become set in their ways and are more likely to maintain party 
identifications. One would think that if any change did occur, it
would be more likely to be the other way, from Liberal to Labor, 
as people reached old-age pension age.
62 Campbell, Converse, Miller $ Stokes illustrate the strong effect 
the Depression had on those voting for the first time in 1932 in 
the United States. The proportion of 'coming of age' voters who 
voted Democrat in 1928 was 38%, and in 1932 was 80%. See The 
American Voter, 1960, p. 155.
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6 3found in the Australian Survey Project data. ' The largest proportion 
of female non-Labor identifiers is not found amongst the oldest
group (58 percent), but among the second oldest (64 percent) - those 
who reached maturity during the Depression. And the smallest proportion 
of such people is found in the third oldest group (47 percent), those 
who reached maturity during Labor's heyday. This group also had the
highest proportion of Labor identifiers among the women, namely 44 
percent, compared with the overall average of 37 percent. Interestingly,
64the generation effect is more marked for women than it is for men.
The second reason that Aitkin and Kahan suggest, that of education, 
is strongly refuted by the evidence. As we saw from Table.2, the less 
education a woman has, the more likely is she to vote for the Labor 
Party; the opposite of what Aitkin and Kahan are suggesting. In fact, 
among those with primary school education only, the figures are almost 
identical for each sex. This finding also goes against the hypothesis 
that sex differences are least at highest education levels.
The third claim of Aitkin and Kahan is that women who work less 
will be more likely to vote Liberal. This is also incorrect, as the 
following table shows.
63 Aitkin has distinguished 5 generations: I - aged 61-95, a hetero­
geneous group; II - 53-60, Depression generation; III - 44-52, 
those who reached maturity in Labor's heyday; IV - 36-43, those
reaching maturity during the post-war Menzies government; V - 21-35, those who came or age during the DLP's existence. Stability
and Change in Australian Politics, forthcoming, Chap. 6.
64 The range in proportions of non-Labor identifiers over the gener­
ations is 17 percentage points for the women,and 5 percentage 
points for the men. This could suggest either that at time of 
first vote, women are more likely to be influenced by the political 
climate of the time than men are, or that women are more likely to 
maintain their first party preference, while men change.
65 As discussed earlier, p. 64, we can only accurately know the employ­
ment status of those respondents not classified as heads of house­
holds. Thus the table is presented' for women only, as the one-third 
of males who are not heads would not be comparable with the female 
non-heads.
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Table 11: Employment status and party identification , women
Non-heads Heads
Full-time Part-time Not working
% % % %
Non-Labor 51 56 56 54
Labor 38 38 36 39
No Party 11 6 8 7
100 100 100 100
(167) (108) (460) (163)
While the difference between those women (who are not heads) working
full-time outside the home, and those not working is in the expected
direction, it is not statistically significant. Furthermore, if we 
assume that most of the women who are classified as heads of house­
holds are working full-time, and include them with the other women 
working full-time, the difference is reduced to 3 percentage points.
The final suggestion of Aitkin and Kahan, that women's greater 
preference for conservative parties is partly due to the fact that 
they earn less than men, cannot be directly tested because of the 
lack of information on income of the women in the sample. There seems 
to be no a priori reason why this should be so, particularly as low 
income, as with low education, is usually correlated with voting 
Labor rather than non-Labor.
A factor that Aitkin and Kahan do not mention, but is sometimes 
regarded as an explanation of women's 'greater conservatism',or if 
not an explanation then at least a closely linked factor, is religion. 
The argument is that people who attend church regularly tend to be 
more conservative than non-attenders. As more women than men attend 
church regularly, more women than men will be conservative.
66 Duverger, The Political Role of Women, 1955, suggested that women 
are 'more subject to religious influences', p. 122. For example, 
he found that more women than men vote for the German Christian 
Democrat Party. Lane's 'moralized orientation' of women may also 
be seen to be linked to religion.
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The hypothesis cannot be tested rigorously by the Australian
Survey Project data, because information on church attendance for the
whole of the sample was not available to me. However, the sample
of 390 new respondents does provide some degree of support. Men and
6 7women who attended church with moderate or high frequency were more 
likely to be non-Labor supporters than were those who never attended 
church or attended at most once a year. The proportion of non-Labor 
identifiers are 54 percent and 39 percent respectively. Furthermore, 
more women than men attended church: in the subsample, three-quarters 
of the women were at least moderate church attenders, but only half 
the men were.
These findings do give some support to the hypothesis, although
the sample size is too small to give too much importance to the result,
6 8especially as they may not be generalisable to the whole sample.
And from the whole sample we discover that nominated religion also 
has an effect on party identification. .Among non-Catholics, the 
proportion of non-Labor identifiers is 59 percent of women and 47 
percent of men. But among those who nominate their religion as Roman 
Catholic, only 43 percent of women and 40 percent of men support the 
non-Labor parties. Indeed, more Catholics of both sexes support the 
ALP (47 percent and 43 percent respectively). As 71 percent of the 
sample say they are non-Catholic, while only 24 percent are Catholic,
67 Moderate to high frequency is defined as going to church at least 
several times a year.
68 The subsample has a different distribution of party identification 
from the total sample:
Subsample Total Sample
F M F M
% % % %
Non-Labor 48 48 55 45
Labor 40 38 37 42
No party 12 14 8 13
100 100 100 100
(155) (235) (898)(975)
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it may be this factor, rather than church attendance as such, that
69produces the correlation between religion and party identification.
It was mentioned earlier that the difference in proportion of 
each sex who are migrants is statistically significant. 23 percent 
of the men and 18 percent of the women were born overseas. While 
there is also some degree of difference in the distribution of party 
identification between those born overseas and those born in Australia, 
the proportion of migrants is too small to have much impact on the 
overall figures. The foreign-born men are less likely to support the 
ALP, and more likely to have no party identification than are the 
Australian-born men. However, the difference in proportions who have 
no party identification is not enough to account for the difference 
between the sexes, as there are still 12 percent of Australian-born 
men who say they have no party identification, compared with 8 per 
cent of the Australian-born women. In contrast to the male migrants, 
female migrants are more likely to support the ALP than are their 
Australian-born counterparts (42 percent of migrant women and 36 per 
cent of Australian-born women support the ALP). There is an even 
greater difference among non-Labor supporters, with 46 percent of 
migrant women and 56 percent of Australian-born women identifying 
this way. The difference is significant (p less than .05). We would 
have to look at the length of time spent in Australia, and perhaps 
country of origin, before speculating on the reasons for these diff­
erences - both between migrant and Australian-born women, and migrant 
women and men.
69 This could only be tested by controlling for both religious affil­
iation and church attendance, to discover which provided the greater 
variation in party identification. The subsample is far too small 
to allow this.
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This discussion of party identification and various socio­
economic factors suggests that the differences between the sexes 
cannot be simply explained solely by reference to differences in 
social groupings (other than possibly a difference in church attendance). 
Thus the statement of Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, that any 
difference between the sexes is due only to differences in other social 
characteristics, does not apply in Australia. Perhaps the difference
in party identification is because women are, on average, more
70conservative than men. What can we discover from the questions in 
the survey that ask opinions on various issues?
The questionnaire contains a group of 14 opinion questions, 
ranging from issues of direct government policy such as conscription 
and government aid to schools, to more general issues such as censor­
ship and capital punishment. To provide a framework for discussing 
these questions, the issues can be somewhat loosely classified into 
five groups. The first includes two issues that could be regarded 
as important at the time, and on which the Government and the Opposition 
held clear and opposing views. These are Vietnam, and conscription.
The second group includes three issues of domestic policy which were 
not quite so central or visible as the previous two. These are govern­
ment aid to schools, a choice between reducing taxes and spending 
more on social services, and a choice between maintaining full employ­
ment and keeping prices steady.
The third group are issues of foreign policy: Australia-U.S. 
links, foreign investment, and Communist China. The fourth group 
consists of issues which are more 'social' issues than overtly political
70 As discussed earlier, p. 60, if women are, on average, more conserv­
ative than men, there could be a difference in party identification 
such as we observe.
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ones - abolition of the death penalty, immigration (which is probably 
getting at racial attitudes), and censorship. Finally there are three 
issues which are tapping the respondent’s view of the power structure. 
These concern the power of trade unions, the power of big business, 
and strikers.
The alternative opinion statements on Vietnam were presented 
71earlier. We find,not surprisingly, that there is a difference 
between the non-Labor and the Labor supporters, with the former being 
more likely to support the government policy of having troops, including 
conscripts, fighting in Vietnam. Yet this is not supported by even 
a majority of non-Labor supporters: only 42 percent of men and 33 per 
cent of women take this stand. More importantly, this difference 
between the sexes is significant (p less than .01). There is no 
significant difference between the male and female Labor supporters, 
however. Only 6 percent of these women support the most militant 
stand, and 12 percent of men do. The pacifist views, that we should 
be out of Vietnam altogether, or at most have only civilian experts
there, is supported by more women than men, and by far more Labor
72identifiers than non-Labor. We can conclude that there is some 
evidence to suggest that, as with overseas findings, women are more 
likely to take a less militant stand than are men. However, party
71 See above, p. 78.
73 A.Hero, 'The American public and the U.N.', 1966, found that women
are less supportive of the U.N.'s military role than are men.
M. Rosenberg, 'Images in relation to the policy process', 1965, 
pp. 305-307, notes the greater propensity for women to take pacifist 
stands, although other writers he cites interpret this as showing 
that the men are 'more closely attuned to the viewpoints as expressed 
by American leaders than are the females', (quoted p. 306). S.Verba 
et al, 'Public opinion and the war in Vietnam', 1967, found signif­
icant sex differences in scales of escalation and de-escalation, 
with more women taking pacifist stands.
72 The proportions supporting (C) or (D) are: non-Labor - 19% of
women, 16% of men; Labor - 46% of women, 44% of men.
identification has a stronger effect, and the sex difference is 
significant only among the non-Labor supporters.
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While fewer women than men support the first position, that there 
should be troops, including conscripts, in Vietnam, this is partly
offset by the fact that more women than men support the second stand,
74that there should be troops, but not conscripts,there. So what do
the sexes feel about conscription generally? The figures are given
75for the party groupings in the following table.
Table 12: Attitudes toward conscription
Non- Labor Labor Total*
F M F M F M
% % % % % %A Conscription for all 41 50 35 39 37 44
B Current system 8 11 4 6 6 8
C Civilian alternative 39 32 29 27 36 30
D No conscription 10 5 29 27 18 16
No opinion 2 2 3 2 3 2
100 100 100 101 100 100
(489) (438) (334) (406) (898) (975) 
* Including those who have no party identification
The pattern is similar to that found with attitudes toward 
Vietnam. Women are less likely to support conscription, either for 
all young men or for some, and Labor supporters of both sexes are more 
likely to advocate that there should be no conscription. Again, the 
sex difference is significant (p less than .01) among non-Labor supporters 
but not among the Labor identifiers. A similar sex difference was
74 46% of women and 41% of men hold this view, which is the most 
popular of the four alternatives.
75 The alternatives are: (A) we should have conscription for military
service and it should be for all young men, not just for some;
(B) the present system of the ballot for conscription should be 
continued; (C) we should have conscription, but those who are 
opposed to fighting should be allowed to do their national service 
in other ways; (D) we shouldn't have any form of conscription at 
all. (Question 28(a))
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found in another, smaller,Australian survey. It is of interest to 
note that the government's position on conscription (policy B) was 
even less popular with the sample than was its position on Vietnam.
This suggests that the respondents have thought about the issues, 
and are not just accepting the status quo, which they may be more 
inclined to do if they did not have an attitude on the issues.
So far we have not found evidence that more women than men take 
conservative stands on issues. If anything, we have found the reverse.
Nor is there any clearer evidence from the next group of issues, those 
which concern domestic political matters. On government aid to
schools, the question asked which of the following came closest to 
the respondent's opinion.
(A) the government should not give any financial help at all to 
private or church schools
(B) the government should not give any financial help to these schools 
until state schools have been brought up to date
(C) the government should give help, but only to really needy church 
schools
(D) the government should give as much help as possible to both 
private and church schools.
76 J. Western 5 P. Wilson, 'Attitudes to conscription', 1967, found 
in a Canberra survey of 98 women and 80 men, that while 45% of men 
supported conscription, only 31% of women did. 26% of men and 
37% of women opposed it; the rest took a moderate view. Also, 
middle class men were more likely to support conscription than were 
working class men, while there was no difference among the women.
This parallels the above finding concerning the differences among 
the party supporters.
77 It is of course a matter for debate whether militancy can be regarded 
as conservatism, and pacifism as liberalism. Certainly opposition
to the Vietnam war was held by people regarded as radical - such 
as students, and left-wing members of the ALP. This highlights 
the problems in using a summary terr.i such as 'conservatism' . A
clear, if pragmatic, statement of the meaning of conservatism and 
liberalism can be found in Adorno et al, The Authoritarian 
Personality, 1950, Chapter 5.
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It is difficult to say which of these policies is the most conserv­
ative and which is the most liberal. The problem of interpretation 
arises because the private and church schools include both those that 
could be regarded as elitist, as they cater for children of relatively 
well-off people, and the Catholic schools, which are chronically short
of funds. Thus statement (D) could be seen either as supporting an 
elitist position (in which case it is the most conservative stand), 
or as supporting a high degree of social welfare (which would make
it the most liberal position). In fact, Liberal-Country Party policy 
at the time was closest to (D), in that it gave aid to all schools -
'as much as possible' as determined by the priority it gave to 
education. ALP policy was not clearly any one of these positions,
particularly as there was a split in the party over the issue. As
a compromise, its policy was that it would bring all schools up to
acceptable standards, while acknowledging its primary obligation
78was to government schools.
Given these ambiguities, we cannot assume that respondents 
choosing the same alternative would all mean the same thing by it.
The figures can hardly be regarded as meaningful, therefore, so are 
given without comment. Statement (D) was the most popular, being 
supported by 47 percent of the men and 43 percent of the women. There 
was little difference between the non-Labor and the Labor supporters. 
Statement (B) was the next most popular, with 23 percent of men and 
28 percent of women choosing it. Despite the ambiguities, only 3 
percent of men and 2 percent of women had no opinion on the issue.
The next issue of domestic policy is not so ambiguous. The question 
asked 'If the Government had a choice between reducing taxes or spend­
ing more on social services, what do you think it should do?' The
78 I wish to thank Sue Read for clarifying this for me.
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people in the survey show their acceptance of social welfare, as
70 percent say that they would prefer more to be spent on social 
79services. And they do not see the issue in party terms, as 68 
percent of non-Labor identifiers support this alternative, compared 
with 72 percent of the Labor identifiers. More importantly, there 
is virtually no difference between the sexes, regardless of party 
identification.
The third domestic issue represents a choice between full em-
80ployment and keeping prices steady. Again we find the majority 
of the sample - 61 percent - taking the more liberal view of preferr­
ing full employment. The difference between the parties is only 
marginal (60 percent of non-Labor and 66 percent of Labor supporters 
prefer full employment). However, there is a significant sex 
difference (p less than .01) in that among non-Labor supporters, 
more women than men want full employment (63 percent to 57 percent 
respectively), and conversely, more men want steady prices (37 per­
cent to 27 percent). There is no significant difference among the 
Labor supporters. Yet again, we have evidence that if anything,
fewer women than men take a conservative stand. At least we can 
conclude from the discussion of the first 5 issues that there is no 
evidence of the reverse being true.
79 The question is rather biased though. One wonders what answers 
people would have given if the choice had been between increasing 
taxes or spending less on social services, or even the status quo 
versus increased taxes and increased social services.
80 This is a real alternative, according to economic theory. Even 
under present economic conditions where there is a high rate of 
inflation and a high level of unemployment, one can be improved 
only at the detriment of the other. The respondents, hardly 
surprisingly, did not appreciate this - only 32% recognised there 
is a conflict, and 40% said there was not (question 29(a)) Never­
theless, only 9% would not venture to choose an alternative.
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The next three issues are related to foreign policy. On the 
question of Australia - U.S. links, we again find more men than
81women taking the position closest to Liberal-Country Party policy:
48 percent of men and only 40 percent of women wanted very close
links, while more women than men advocated only fairly close or not 
very close links. The difference is particularly striking among 
Labor supporters, where although 42 percent of the men wanted very 
close links, only 27 percent of the women did - a difference that is 
statistically significant (p less that .01). The difference is in 
the same direction among non-Labor Supporters (57 percent male, 50 
percent female) but is not statistically significant.
The first glimmer of evidence to support the 'women are con-
8 2servative' hypothesis comes concerning the question of China.
55 percent of women, and 51 percent of men, felt that we had a lot 
to worry about in regard to Communist China, while only 27 percent 
of women and 41 percent of men thought that there would be no problem. 
Non-Labor people are more concerned than Labor (63 percent to 42 
percent respectively feel that we have a lot to worry about), and 
the difference between the sexes is significant (p less that .01) 
for both party groupings. It should be noted that so far, this ' 
issue has the highest proportion of people who say they have no
83opinion - 8 percent of men and 19 percent of women had no opinion. 
Perhaps this suggests that China is a less salient issue to the
81 Do you think Australia's links with the U.S. should be very close 
fairly close, or not very close? (Q 23)
82 Looking into the future, do you feel that Australia will have a 
lot to worry about in regard to Communist China, or do you feel 
that China probably won't be much of a problem for us?
83 Among the other questions discussed so far, only the one on em­
ployment or steady prices has more than only 2% or 3% of 'don't 
know' answers, with 8% of men and 9% of women saying this.
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sample than are the other issues so far discussed. However, when we 
consider just those who have an opinion, the difference between the 
sexes is even greater.
With the next issue, that of foreign investment, we are back to 
the finding that more men than women support the conservative position,
or at least the position of the Liberal-Country Party government.
While the majority felt that Australia should be on its guard against 
foreign investors (60 percent of men, 61 percent of women), 28 percent
of men and only 21 percent of women felt that we should welcome 
foreign investment. The difference between the sexes on this position 
is 10 percentage points among non-Labor supporters and 6 points among 
Labor. Both differences are significant (p less than .01).
The next three issues are social, rather than economic or overtly 
political, ones. On immigration, the respondents were presented with 
the following alternatives:
(A) Asians should be allowed to enter Australia as migrants just like 
people of European descent
(B) there should be a small quota of Asian migrants
(C) Asians should not be allowed to enter Australia as migrants
(D) we should only allow people from Britain and northern Europe to 
enter Australia as migrants
(E) we should not have any more migrants at the present time.
This question seems to be getting at racial attitudes rather than 
attitudes to migration as such, although alternative (E) could be 
interpreted either way. Taking the question as a measure of ethno- 
centrism, it is of interest to note that only 5 percent of men and 4 
percent of women support statement (C). The least prejudiced view,
statement (A), is supported by more women than men, while the men are 
more likely to want only a small quota of Asian migrants. Thus 27 per 
cent of women and 20 percent of men support statement (A), while
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40 percent and 43 percent respectively support (B). Statements (C) 
and (D) combined, which can be regarded as showing a relatively high 
degree of prejudice, are supported by 25 percent of men and only 17 
percent of women. The difference between the sexes is significant 
(p less than .01), and we can conclude that yet again the evidence
84suggests that women are less likely to te conservative than are men.
The next issue concerns abolition of the death penalty. If we 
regard advocating its abolition as the more humane and liberal view, 
then more women than men are seen to be humane and liberal. Over half 
the men (52 percent) want the death penalty kept, but only 39 percent 
of women do. Conversely, 50 percent of the women say it should be 
abolished, compared with 41 percent of the men. Non-Labor supporters 
are more likely to favour retention, but there is a large and significant 
sex difference (p less than .01). The difference is not so large,
but is still statistically significant, among the Labor supporters 
(p less than .01). Eleven percent of the women and 7 percent of the 
men say they have no opinion. When these respondents are omitted, 
the difference between the sexes is even greater.
The final issue in this group is censorship. We find there is 
a significant sex difference only among Labor supporters. While 51
percent of the Labor men say there should be some censorship, only 
45 percent of the women do (p less than .05). Among non-Labor supporters, 
63 percent of each sex think there should be some censorship. Thus, 
for the whole sample, 41 percent of men and 43 percent of women advocate 
that one should be allowed to read what one likes. Only 2 percent of 
each sex had no opinion.
84 More women than men do support alternative (E), that there should 
be no more immigration at present. The proportions are 13% to 9% 
respectively. As it is not clear what meaning the respondent 
would have attached to this - either extreme ethnocentrism, or 
concern about Australia's population and resources - it cannot be 
taken to invalidate the conclusion.
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The discussion of these three social issues confirms what was found 
for the previous issues. At this stage, only one issue of eleven gives 
any degree of support for the ’women are more conservative’ hypothesis. 
And this issue - concerning Communist China - also has the highest 
proportion of ’don't know' answers. Thus the findings indicate that 
more women than men support policies that are liberal rather than 
conservative. If in fact women were more conservative than men, we 
would expect to have found differences in the opposite direction to 
those that we have observed.
The final group of issues - three questions relating to the power 
structure - do, however, provide evidence that could be seen as support
for the hypothesis. But at the same time, two of these questions have 
a relatively high proportion of 'don't know' answers, and the third 
has a high number of respondents who are ambivalent.
Taking the last one first, the question asked was 'When you hear 
of a strike, are your sympathies generally for or against the strikers?' 
The answers were coded, however, to cater for those who said 'it 
depends', and 41 percent of the sample gave this unprompted answer.
We could assume that if this alternative had been presented to the 
respondents, even more would have chosen it. However, another 41 per
cent said they were generally against strikers, while only 16 percent 
usually supported them. There is a sex difference in that 18 percent of 
the men and 14 percent of the women supported strikers, while the 
corresponding proportions of those whose sympathies were against 
strikers were 37 percent and 46 percent. The difference is significant 
(p less than .01).
The other two issues concern the relative power of trade unions 
and big business. The first was 'Do you think that trade unions in 
this country have too much power or not too much?', and the second 
was similarly worded, for big business. In keeping with the findings 
on strikers, we find more women than men saying that the trade unions
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have too much power (59 percent to 49 percent respectively).. Not 
surprisingly, there is a difference between the different party sup­
porters - 70 percent of non-Labor supporters but only 34 percent of 
Labor supporters think that the unions have too much power. Further, 
within each group there is a significant sex difference (p less than 
.01), in both cases of 8 percentage points. There is also a sex 
difference in proportions who say they have no opinion, with 15 percent 
of women and 7 percent of men in this category. This indicates 
firstly that the issue is not as salient as have been some of the 
issues discussed previously, and secondly that more women than men 
do not see it as salient.
There are similar proportions of 'don't know' answers with the 
final issue, of the power of big business, where 16 percent of women 
and 8 percent of men gave this answer. The difference between the 
sexes also arises among those who did have an opinion. Thus while 
59 percent of the men in the sample felt that big business has too 
much power, only 50 percent of the women felt this way. The difference 
between the sexes is again significant (p less than .01). As we would 
expect, there is a difference between Labor and non-Labor identifiers: 
64 percent of the former say that business has too much power, compared 
with 47 percent of the latter.
While both issues, trade union power and business power, are 
related to party identification, it is not a simple matter of one 
being seen to have the power while the other does not. Less than half 
of those who gave an opinion on both issues see the situation in terms 
of a 'class struggle'. We can distinguish four groups, which for 
simplicity can be termed: the workers (trade unions do not have too 
much power, but big business does); the capitalists (vice versa);
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the cynics (both have too much); and the optimists (neither group has 
too much power).85 We get the following distribution.
Table 13: Views of the power structure
Non- Labor Labor Total
F M F M F M
% % % % % %
Workers 7 11 36 51 18 31
Capitalists 37 29 14 10 27 19
Cynics 46 42 33 23 42 33
Optimists 10 18 17 16 13 17
100 100 100 100 100 100
(375) (380) (242) (349) (668)(840;
These figures also give some support to the 'women are conserv­
ative' hypothesis, as more men than women are 'workers', while more 
women than men are 'capitalists'. The largest proportion of women are 
cynics - 42 percent believe that both groups have too much power, 
although only 33 percent of men hold this opinion. Perhaps this 
indicates that if there is a difference between the sexes it is more 
of a difference in their views of the power structure of society, 
rather than a difference in degree of conservatism.86
Another explanation as to why the last group of issues show that 
more women than men are conservative, in contrast to the findings on 
the previous issues, is that these three issues are the most directly 
related to the business world. We have seen that only a minority of 
the women in the sample are working full-time, so that the majority of 
women have no direct experience of trade unions or of big business. 
Indeed, even women who are working will probably have less involvement
85 Quite clearly, my value judgments are showing.
86 This finding gives some indirect support for the hypothesis that 
women have less of a sense of political efficacy than do men -
an hypothesis on which we found some factual evidence in the over­
seas studies. The people who see both trade unions and big business 
as having too much power may be seeing this in relation to their 
own degree of power, or political efficacy.
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than men have, with trade unions (fewer women belong to unions), and
with the power aspects of big business. This lesser involvement on
the part of women explains why the issues do not seem as salient to
them. It can also explain the greater proportion of women supporting
the conservative stands: having little or no direct experience from
which to form an opinion, they are more likely to rely on the media,
87which tend to be conservative. At least, the media emphasise the 
disruptive effects of strikes and the corresponding power of trade 
unions, far more so than they mention the power of big business.
So what do we conclude, as regards the supposedly greater con­
servatism of women? We found that there was a significant difference 
in party identification, with more women than men supporting the 
non-Labor parties. If it is true that women are more conservative 
than men, this result on party identification would be expected. So 
we looked at some issues of public opinion to see if a similar pattern
existed. Among 14 items, only one did not have a significant differ-
89ence - on taxes versus social services. Another was too ambiguous 
to be meaningful (Government aid to schools). Four issues provided 
some degree of support, in that more women than men chose the conserv­
ative position. These issues concerned China, the power of trade 
unions and big business, and strikers. While the sex differences 
were statistically significant, none was large enough to indicate a
87 My thanks to Stephen Mugford for suggesting this point.
88 From this sample, the difference comes from support for the Liberal 
Party only; there is no difference in support for the Country Party 
or the DLP.
89 There is also no significant difference between the sexes for the 
total sample on both Vietnam and censorship. However, when we 
look at party groupings, there is a significant difference among 
non-Labor supporters on Vietnam (p less than .01), and among Labor 
supporters on censorship (p less than .05). Conversely, there is
a significant difference on sympathy towards strikers for the whole 
sample (p less than .01), but not among the party groupings.
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difference that would affect the majority of each sex. All four 
issues also had the greatest proportions of no opinion responses, 
and it is argued that fewer women than men regard them as salient to 
them.
The most important evidence, however, is that there are eight 
other items on which there was a significant difference, but the 
difference was in the opposite direction to that which we would expect. 
If we were to make any statement on the relative degree of conservatism 
of men and women from this somewhat arbitrary list of issues, it would 
have to be that it is the men who are the more conservative, not the 
women. However, as I have been arguing that it is incorrect to draw 
a conclusion concerning degree of conservatism from figures indicating 
incidence, and as there is so much uncertainty as regards the stability 
of opinions, all I am prepared to conclude from this discussion is 
that it has not been shown that women are more conservative than men. 
Although more women than men support the conservative parties, we
have not shown that it is because women are more conservative. The
90explanation must be sought elsewhere.
3.6 Husband-Wife Relationships
One of the most pervasive (and subversive) claims concerning 
the political role of women, as it occurs through most of the studies
we have discussed, is that women follow their husbands in political
matters. Thus Duverger sees women having the mentality of minors
91because they accept paternalism from men, while to Burns, women are
90 The simplest explanation is that the conservatism that attracts 
people to the Liberal Party, if indeed it is conservatism, is 
different from the conservatism as seen in relation to the issues 
we have discussed. Maybe all this indicates is that people do 
not maintain consistent stands, which is likely once we accept
that many people do not have well-thought out ideological positions.
91 M. Duverger, The Political Role of Women, 1955, p. 129.
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92just 'mindless matrons' because they follow their husbands. At 
least some writers have seen the inherent contradiction with this
claim and the one that women are more conservative - if the latter
93is true, then some women are not following their husbands. We 
have also seen from previous studies that while there is evidence 
that some women vote for a party because of the influence of their 
husbands, this is true for only a small minority.^
The 1969 Australian survey did not ask any direct questions on 
husband-wife influence, but it did ask who the respondent talked to
about the campaign, what was the most important source of political 
information for the respondent, and whether the respondent told 
anyone how to vote. From these questions we find little support for 
the hypothesis that women follow their husbands.
Firstly, we can find out to what extent husbands and wives vote 
the same way. In the survey, the spouse of the respondent was not 
asked directly how he or she voted, so the information is recorded 
for how the respondents think their spouses voted. This would, if
anything, provide an overestimation of the number who claim their spouse
95voted the same way as they do. If this bias does exist, it is rather 
surprising to find that 25 percent of the married men in the sample, and
92 C. Burns, Parties and People, 1961, p. 125.
93 D. Rawson notes the contradiction in Australia Votes, 1961, p. 168. 
It is possible that the differece could come from unmarried people. 
But there seem to be no a priori reasons why single, widowed and 
divorced women would be more conservative than such men.
94 I have estimated the proportion to be between 4% and 10% of women 
from a U.S. study (see above, p. 14), and around 10% of women from 
a British study (see above, p. 36).
95 Social psychologists talk of the processes of assimilation and 
contrast: we tend to perceive similar objects as more similar than 
they in fact are, and different objects as more different than they 
are. In political science studies it is found that people ascribe 
ideas similar to theirs to people they perceive as being, to some 
degree, similar to them. See D. Sears, 'Political behavior', 1969
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16 percent of the married women say, they do not know how their spouses 
voted. There is, nevertheless, only a small proportion of married 
couples who vote for opposite parties. About 10 percent of respondents 
whose own party identification was non-Labor said their spouses had 
voted Labor in 1969. In keeping with the sex difference in party 
identification, we find only 7 percent of the non-Labor men had wives 
who supported Labor, while 13 percent of the non-Labor women had
husbands voting Labor. But there is not the same difference among 
Labor identifiers, where 10 percent of both the men and the women had 
spouses who voted for non-Labor parties.
One could interpret the finding that more women than men know 
their spouse's vote as support for the hypothesis under discussion.
If the women are simply being told how to vote, they would indeed 
know their husband's party preference. But it may also negate the 
hypothesis: if the men were telling their wives how to vote, one would 
assume that the husband would be able to say how his wife voted - 
unless he suspected that she may not have done as she was told! It
is not clear, therefore, why the difference in knowledge of spouse's 
vote exists. Perhaps the early claim by Lazarsfeld et al - that men
do not discuss politics with their wives, they tell them^ _ ^as some 
truth in it. The husband expounds his views, but does not bother to 
listen to what his wife has to say. However, as the majority of 
married couples can say how their partner voted - or at least say 
how they think they voted - this claim, if true, would apply to only 
a small number of people.
A closer measure of the extent of personal influence comes from 
the questions in the survey that asked 'Did you talk to other people 
about the election?' and if so, 'Whom did you talk to about the
96 See above, p. 14.
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election?' ^  Almost two-thirds of the sample said they talked about 
the election. The first three people that the respondents said they 
talked to were coded, and this gives the breakdown in the following 
table. It should be noted that the percentages add to more than 100 
because some respondents talked to people from different categories.
Table 14: Discussions of the election
Female Male
% %
Spouse 28 18
Father 4 4
Mother 5 3
Other relatives 24 15
Workmates 11 43
Friends 30 32
Talked to no-one 41 30
(898) (975)
There are clear differences between the sexes. While 28 percent 
of the women said they discussed the election with their husbands, only 
18 percent of men said they discussed it wiht their wives. Women were 
also more likely to have discussions with other relatives - 24 percent 
to 15 percent. Conversely, more men than women said they discussed 
the election with people they worked with - 43 percent to 11 percent. 
This is obviously partly because more men than women work outside the
home.
The lack of a difference is also worth noting: there is hardly 
any difference in the proportions of each sex who said they talked 
to friends. There is also hardly any difference in the proportions who 
discussed the election with their parents, both as between the sex of
the respondent, and the sex of the parent.
97 Questions 5(a) and (b).
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We are particularly concerned with husband-wife discussions and 
in light of the claims that women follow their husbands' decision or 
that men tell their wives how to vote, it is surprising to find that 
a large proportion of the sample do not discuss politics with their 
spouse: 62 percent of the married women in the sample, and 77 percent 
of the married men, did not discuss the election with their spouse.
This may just mean, the persistent researcher would argue, that there 
is no need for there to be any discussion - the wife already knows 
her husband's views and will follow them without him having to remind 
her to do so.
But this is no more than speculation. The evidence cannot confirm 
that the wife is simply following her husband. A more reasonable 
conclusion is that while more women than men look to their spouses 
for political discussions, it is partly a question of access. Indeed, 
given that we found that half the women in the sample are not working
it is surprising to find that only 38 percent of women report political
98discussions with their spouse.
Even stronger evidence against the influence of the husband
comes when we consider the relative importance of poeple and the media
99as sources of information about the election. Taking just those
who talked to other people about the election, only 30 percent of the 
women and 25 percent of the men considered discussions with other 
people to be more important, while 62 percent of the women and 66
percent of the men claimed they found out more from television and
98 Katz and Lazarsfeld, in Personal Influence, 1955, note in relation 
to naming a person whom the respondent believed to be trustworthy 
and knowledgeable about matters of public concern, that 'considering 
the general availability of the husband, it is interesting to
find almost as many neighbors as husbands among the married women's 
listings'. (p. 141)
99 Question 5(c): Do you feel you found out more about the election 
from talking to other people or from newspapers and TV?
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newspapers. This finding contradicts the claim by Campbell, Converse, 
Miller and Stokes that men act as political mediators for women, 
sifting through political information and passing on their decision 
to their wives. The women are doing their own sifting.
Finally there is a very direct measure of political influence.
The respondents were asked 'Did you suggest to anyone how they should 
vote?' and if so, to whom.1^1 Only 12 percent of the sample said 
they did, and of these, 63 were men saying they told their wives, 
and 17 were women saying they told their husbands. This means that 
only 6 percent of the men in the sample - 9 percent of married men - 
admit to suggesting to their wives how to vote. If in fact men 
dominate over their wives in political matters, we could expect a few 
more men than this to admit it. But as with so many of the claims 
about women's political roles, the researchers who make such claims 
are doing nothing more than speculating.
To return to our building metaphor, speculation in the building 
industry has often paid hamdsome dividends. Some political scientists 
have also made much capital out of speculation in their building of 
an image of women's political roles. I have tried to show how 
faulty the construction is at all levels, from foundations, to mortar 
and structural reinforcement. Furthermore, when we come to reconstruct, 
at least in Australia, we find that we do not have as many factual 
bricks as we could have expected. I hope that this study will help 
towards ending the speculation. When large profits are being made,
someone is being exploited. In this case it is the vomen who lose out.
100 See above, p. 43.
101 Questions 7(a) and (b).
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4 CONCLUSION
When this thesis was originally conceived, the intention was to 
show how the differences in socialisation of males and females produce 
differences in their political behaviour and attitudes. The focus 
changed once I started trying to establish what political differences 
existed, because, as demonstrated in the second chapter, the supposed 
differences are often supported by rhetoric, and rarely by reasoned 
argument based on clear statistical evidence. This led me to analyse 
a set of data to discover where the differences lay. It was still my 
intention to try to explain the differences that did exist by reference 
to differential childhood and adult socialisation.
This has not been done, for two reasons. The first is that 
after surveying the literature on political socialisation I felt that 
the research in this area is at this stage inadequate as an explanation 
of how people come to acquire adult political beliefs.1 Apart from 
the criticisms that childhood attitudes have not been shown to be 
meaningful or stable, and that they do not necessarily have a link with 
adult orientations, there is an even more serious omission. It is that 
the researchers in this area make little effort to incorporate the find­
ings of the social psychologists on the topic of socialisation in 
general.
To understand why it is that sex differences in political 
behaviour exist, I felt it would be necessary to draw, from the field 
of social psychology, information on sex identification, ?ex role 
socialisation, the development of attitude systems, the interaction be­
tween general attitudes and specific political ones, and the relationship
1 The criticisms are briefly discussed in the first chapter.
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between personality and political outlook.“ It would also be necessary 
to draw on an area in which there is little research as yet, namely on 
the relationship between the socialisation process and the structure 
of society when the society is regarded as a patriarchal one. Such 
an integrated approach has turned out to be beyond the scope of this 
thesis.
2
The second reason for not developing an explanation of the sex 
differences in political behaviour is a simple one - that there is 
little to be explained. I had expected to find some degree of differ­
ence, firstly because of constant references to sex differences in the 
political science literature, as shown by the quotations given at the 
start of Chapter 2. Secondly, I expected differences because of the 
pervasive assumption in virtually all societies, that males and fe­
males are different, not only biologically, but also socially. This 
is reflected objectively in the structure of societies, particularly 
in the division of labour, and subjectively in our attitudes toward 
anything that is regarded as sex-specific.
But what do we find? From both a careful reading of past studies, 
and an analysis of data from an Australian survey,it seems that while some 
differences exist, they are never large enough for us to make statements 
to the effect that women (or most women) are different from men (or 
most men) in their political attitudes and behaviour. Once we start to 
use a balanced view that focuses on both the differences and the
2 The little work that has been done on this last topic tends to 
focus on national characteristics and political attitudes. There 
is also some work following on from one of the major studies in
this field, namely Adorno et al, The Authoritarian Personality, 1950> 
See R. Brown, Social Psychology, 1965, Chap. 10, for a discussion 
of the area.
3 There already exists research into the influence of socio-economic
factors on differential patterns of child-rearing. See E. Zigler 
$ I. Child, 'Socialization', 1969.
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similarities, we are aware that there is a far greater degree of 
similarity between the sexes than there are differences. Thus while it 
is true to say that fewer women than men participate actively in 
politics, it is also true to say that few people participate actively 
in politics.
What we need to explain, then, is why the similarities exist, 
given that men and women are thought to be different. More correctly,
A
given that there are known differences between the sexes in personality 
and in day-to-day living patterns and experiences,^ we. can ask why these 
differences do not carry over to political behaviour.
The most obvious reason is one that has been touched on: that 
political behaviour can hardly be regarded as an important part of the
lives of most men and women. In fact, politics hardly has a part at 
all, and it is almost being presumptuous of political scientists to 
think otherwise. That it lias such a small part in people's lives is 
evidenced by the low levels of interest, of participation, and of know­
ledge, and also the low degree of stability of opinions. Admittedly, 
two-thirds of the Australian sample claimed to have discussed the 
election campaign, but an election seems to be the only time that 
people do become interested in politics. Even then, only a third of the 
sample claimed to have a good deal of interest in the election. And 
only one-fifth claim they have a similar degree of interest in 
politics generally.
4 The question of whether such differences are socially conditioned or 
innate is not relevant here. That they exist is well-known. A 
good discussion is provided by A. Oakley, Sex, Gender § Society, 1972 
Chapter 2
5 There is both the difference created by the fact that most men work 
outside the home while many women work inside the home, and also the 
difference caused by occupational segregation for those men and 
women working outside the home: see M. Power, 'Women's work is 
never done - by men', 1974
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Thus if politics is hardly an issue to four-fifths of our sample, 
is it any wonder that there is little difference between the sexes? We 
do not have to advance speculations about politics being a man's world:6 7
few men themselves see politics as their world.
Another reason for a lack of a difference between the sexes in 
political matters is that politics is not seen to be sex-specific.
In other words,sex is not a social factor in the same way that other 
socio-economic variables are. This is quite plausible as where 
politics does impinge on people's lives, it is often in areas where men 
and women have similar experiences. Thus in Australia where voting is 
compulsory for all adults, male and female, participation at this level 
becomes the same experience for men and women. Similarly with tele­
vision viewing: if there is little difference between the sexes in view­
ing patterns, which is what we would expect given that most viewing 
occurs when both sexes are at home, then we can expect there to be 
little difference in proportions who follow political news on television. 
And this is what we find, that two-thirds of both men and women say they 
followed the campaign through this medium.
The differences arise only when they relate to different life 
experiences of men and women. Thus it was suggested that as men are like­
ly to read a paper on their way to work, this explains why more men than 
women follow political news in the papers, Again, as more men than 
women work outside the home, we would expect to find that men are more 
likely to discuss an election with their work colleagues, and this is 
what we found. There is no a priori reason why there would be a
6 As several of the researchers do. See footnote 109, p. 54, above.
7 This is so, at least in those areas where politics can be seen to 
be directly relevant to people's immediate environment. At more 
remote levels, from the choice of election issues to legislative 
processes, the differential treatment of the sexes - a subtle form of 
discrimination - could have a whole thesis written on it.
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difference between the sexes concerning access to friends (or number 
of friends), so it is not surprising to find virtually no sex differ­
ence in political discussions with friends.
Yet some differences between the sexes do exist, that cannot be 
accounted for so simply. More women than men identify with the non- 
Labor parties, and when women are attracted to politics, they are more
Qlikely to join the Liberal Party. But this does not seem to be because 
women are more conservative than men, despite what the researchers say.
If women were more conservative, we would have expected this to show up 
on the set of opinion questions that we looked at. But as we saw, if 
any conclusion could be drawn it would be that women are less conser­
vative than men.
So what causes the difference in party identification? Is it that 
the Liberal Party attracts women, or that the ALP discourages them? No 
clear answer can be given, although perhaps it concerns the parties' 
images. Researchers have found that'the image that the party projects 
can be an important factor in influencing people's party identifications.^ 
And maybe the ALP has projected an image of being male-dominated; this 
is quite likely as it is_ male-dominated.^ Even its name suggests that 
it represents the labour movement, which, because of the number of non­
working women and the number of working women who are not members of a 
trade union, reinforces the image that it is a party for men. The 
Liberal Party on the other hand, while it does not project an image of 
being female-dominated, at least does not appear to be so male-dominated.
8 In 1969 the three women members of Federal parliament were all 
Liberal Party senators.
9 For example, Milne § Mackenzie, Marginal Seat 1955, Chap. 9, and 
Rawson, Australia Votes,1961, Chap. 11, esp. pp. 193-196.
10 There is a chicken-and-egg problem here. But the important thing 
is that once established as male-dominated, it will continue to be 
regarded as such and thus will remain as such.
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If such an explanation is correct, then we will expect to see 
changes in women’s participation in the ALP, because this party has 
begun to change its image.11 The change in its policies towards women 
has undoubtedly come about because of the influence of the Women's 
Movement, reinforced by the appointment of an adviser to the Prime 
Minister on women's affairs. The Movement has had an effect both 
through its radical branch - Women's Liberation - which has high­
lighted the inequalities, discrimination and even oppression that exists 
against women, and the reformist side such as Women's Electoral Lobby, 
which has lobbied for specific changes in legislation.
The Feminist Movement has had an even more direct effect on
women's political roles, because more women are now taking a part in
the institutional political processes, particularly through WEL.
Also, more women are beginning to see their position in the male-
dominated power structure, and to become aware of the other side of
1 2politics, the politics of oppression and liberation.
We do not know yet just how far the Women's Movement will go. We 
can hardly expect that a majority of women will become politicised. 
However, it would not be unreasonable to expect to find that the small 
sex differences that exist - in political interest, knowledge, and 
passive participation - will largely disappear. More importantly, one 
w'ould hope that the large sex differences that exist in active partici­
pation, particularly at the levels of political power and leadership,
11 After the 1974 election there are now 5 women in Federal Parliament,
1 in the Lower Hopse and 4 in the Senate. Three arq ALP members, the other 2 are Liberal. The government has shown itself to be
concerned with women's issues: for example, it has introduced 
maternity leave, a bill to establish more child-care centres, a 
scheme for retraining women, the establishment of women's health 
centres and refuges, and so on.
12 K. Millett, Sexual Politics, 1972, provides one analysis.
l'i 5
will also disappear. It is only when women have equal access to 
political power, and have such access in their own right, that 
there will start to be full equality between the sexes.
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